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THE HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF THE DEBT-EQUITY DISTINCTION
by
Camden Hutchison*
ABSTRACT
This Article uses historical evidence to trace the debt-
equity distinction’s origins, development, and continuing 
evolution. Citing legislative history, business lobbying efforts, 
and important changes in the broader historical context, this 
Article argues that the disparate treatment of debt and equity 
was never a conscious policy goal, but was rather the 
unintended outcome of an extended series of short-term 
political decisions. These political decisions were historically 
specific—i.e., formulated in response to temporary historical 
contingencies—but had consequences that have persisted to 
the present day. The Article concludes by assessing the 
broader implications of this history for both the current 
structure of the U.S. tax system and the prospects of future tax 
reform. 
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I. INTRODUCTION
Few aspects of U.S. tax law have received greater criticism—and 
attracted fewer defenders—than the long-standing distinction between debt 
and equity.1 This feature of the tax system allows corporations to deduct 
interest paid on debt, but not dividends paid to shareholders, from the amount 
of profits on which federal income tax is calculated. Other things being equal, 
the effect of this distinction is to reduce the after-tax cost of debt financing 
relative to equity financing, thus making it less expensive for corporations to 
borrow money than to issue shares. Many economists believe this policy 
encourages corporations to substitute debt for equity, distorting the capital 
structure outcomes that would otherwise obtain in perfect financial markets.2
Legal scholars have argued that while tax law attempts to draw a bright line 
between debt and equity, the distinction lacks a compelling theoretical 
justification, is difficult to draw in practice, and invites tax avoidance 
strategies.3 Critics in the financial and popular press have portrayed the debt-
                                                     
1. For purposes of this Article, “debt” refers to the usual means by which 
corporations borrow money, including loans, bonds, and commercial paper, while 
“equity” refers to capital stock. “Interest” refers to compensation for borrowed money 
that is typically paid to debtholders, while “dividends” refers to distributions of 
corporate income that are typically paid to stockholders. As discussed in this Article, 
the practical and legal distinctions among debt and equity are often problematic. 
2. For a review of the relevant economic literature, see John R. Graham, 
A Review of Taxes and Corporate Finance, 1 FOUND. & TRENDS FINANCE 573, 576–
600 (2006) [hereinafter Graham, A Review of Taxes]. 
3. For perhaps the most well-known critique of the U.S. tax law’s 
treatment of corporate debt, see William T. Plumb. Jr., The Federal Income Tax 
Significance of Corporate Debt: A Critical Analysis and a Proposal, 26 TAX L. REV.
369 (1971) [hereinafter Plumb, The Federal Income Tax Significance of Corporate 
Debt]. For subsequent commentary on the issue, see Ilan Benshalom, How to Live with 
a Tax Code with Which You Disagree: Doctrine, Optimal Tax, Common Sense, and 
the Debt-Equity Distinction, 88 N.C. L. REV. 1217, 1228–37, 1257–73 (2010) 
[hereinafter Benshalom, How to Live with a Tax Code]; Katherine Pratt, The Debt-
Equity Distinction in a Second-Best World, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1055, 1055–93 (2000) 
[hereinafter Pratt, Second-Best World]; Adam Emmerich, Comment, Hybrid 
Instruments and the Debt-Equity Distinction in Corporate Taxation, 52 U. CHI. L.
REV. 118, 133–42 (1985) [hereinafter Emmerich, Hybrid Instruments]. See also
Joseph Allen, Note, Seeking True Financial Reform: Ending the Debt-Equity 
Distinction, 3 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 243 (2012) [hereinafter Allen, Seeking True 
Financial Reform]. Although the term “debt-equity distinction” did not enter 
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equity distinction as an aggravating factor in the 2008 financial crisis, claiming 
that interest deductibility encourages excessive leverage.4 In light of 
Republican presidential candidate Mitt Romney’s past leadership of Bain 
Capital, a private equity firm known for engaging in high-leverage acquisition 
strategies, interest deductibility even emerged as an issue in the 2012 
presidential race.5 Recently, the Obama Administration proposed reducing the 
tax advantage of debt by limiting the ability of corporations to deduct interest 
from taxable income.6 Few observers anticipate significant change, however, 
                                                     
widespread usage until the late 1960s, earlier scholars recognized the problem, which 
they often discussed under the rubric of “thin incorporation” or “thin capitalization.” 
See, e.g., Boris I. Bittker, Thin Capitalization: Some Current Questions, 34 TAXES
830 (1956); Mortimer Caplin, The Caloric Count of a Thin Incorporation, 43 MARQ.
L. REV. 31 (1959); William M. Goldstein, Corporate Indebtedness to Shareholders: 
“Thin Capitalization” and Related Problems, 16 TAX L. REV. 1 (1960); Harry K. 
Mansfield, Thin Incorporation, 40 A.B.A. J. 237 (1954); M. R. Schlesinger, “Thin” 
Incorporations: Income Tax Advantages and Pitfalls, 61 HARV. L. REV. 50 (1947); 
Martin Kurzer, Comment, Thin Incorporation: A Continuing Problem, 51 MARQ. L.
REV. 158 (1967); Note, Thin Capitalization and Tax Avoidance, 55 COLUM. L. REV.
1054 (1955); Note, Thin Incorporation: The Major Tests of Debt or Equity Financing,
1959 WASH. U. L. Q. 433 (1959). 
4. See, e.g., David Cho, Look at Macy’s: Why Companies Can’t Resist: 
U.S. Tax Code Encourages Them to Rack Up Huge Debt, WASH. POST, Aug. 8, 2010; 
Jesse Eisinger, Distortion in Tax Code Makes Debt More Attractive to Banks, N.Y.
TIMES, Sep. 20, 2012, at B4; Robert C. Pozen, Op-Ed, A Recipe for Cutting Corporate 
Taxes, WASH. POST, Oct. 4, 2012; Felix Salmon, How to Reduce the Deductibility of 
Interest Payments, REUTERS BLOG, Feb. 23, 2012, http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-
salmon/2012/02/23/how-to-reduce-the-deductibility-of-interest-payments/; Editorial, 
Reform and Corporate Taxes, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2012, at A26 [hereinafter NYT 
Editorial, Reform and Corporate Taxes]. See also Allen, Seeking True Financial 
Reform, supra note 3. 
5. See William D. Cohan, Private Equity’s Public Subsidy Is a Tragedy: 
William D. Cohan, BLOOMBERGVIEW, Jan. 22 2012, http://www.bloomberg.com/ 
news/2012-01-23/private-equity-s-public-subsidy-is-a-tragedy-william-d-
cohan.html; Anthony Luzzatto Gardner, Romney’s Bain Yielded Private Gains, 
Socialized Losses, BLOOMBERGVIEW, Jul. 15, 2012, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news 
/2012-07-15/romney-s-bain-yielded-private-gains-socialized-losses.html; James 
Surowiecki, Private Inequity, NEW YORKER, Jan. 30, 2012; cf. Josh Barro, Good
Leverage, Bad Leverage and Bain, BLOOMBERGVIEW Jul. 17, 2012, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-07-17/good-leverage-bad-leverage-and-
bain.html. 
6. J. REP. BY WHITE HOUSE & DEP’T OF TREASURY, THE PRESIDENT’S
FRAMEWORK FOR BUSINESS TAX REFORM 5–6, 9–10 (2012) [hereinafter PRESIDENT’S
BUSINESS TAX REFORM]. The House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate 
Finance Committee have also considered limiting interest deductibility. James Politi, 
Congress Weighs Corporate Debt Tax Reform, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 24, 2013. These 
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given the well-known difficulty of fundamental tax reform.7
This widespread criticism presents a puzzle. If economists, legal 
scholars, and other tax commentators are in broad agreement that the 
distinction is unsound, then why does it exist? In other words, how and why 
did U.S. tax law come to embody a principle that tax policy experts reject? 
                                                     
proposals follow earlier efforts by the Bush Administration: the capital gains and 
dividend tax reductions included in the controversial “Bush tax cuts,” for example, 
were intended in part to mitigate the tax advantage of debt. See Press Release, White 
House Office of the Press Secr’y, President Discusses Taking Action to Strengthen 
America’s Economy (Jan. 7, 2003), http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/ 
news/releases/2003/01/20030107-5.html. See also Tax Reform and the Treatment of 
Debt and Equity: J. Hearing Before the Comm. on Ways & Means and S. Fin. Comm.,
112th Cong. (2011) (statement of Pamela F. Olson). The Bush-era capital gains and 
dividend reductions were partially repealed effective January 1, 2013 amidst the 
federal budget crisis. Under these most recent changes enacted by the Obama 
Administration, taxation of capital gains and dividends increased from 15 percent to 
20 percent for individuals earning more than $400,000 (or married couples earning 
more than $450,000) annually. American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 
112-240, § 101(a)(1)–(3), 126 Stat. 2313, 2315–2316 (2013). In addition, for 
individuals earning more than $200,000 (or married couples earning more than 
$250,000) annually, capital gains and dividends are now subject to a 3.8 percent surtax 
under the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act raising the maximum rate on 
investment income to 23.8 percent; this act along with the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act are popularly referred to as “Obamacare”. Health Care and 
Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, § 1402, 124 Stat. 1029, 
1060–61; see Jeff Benjamin, Deal on Dividend Tax Is Small Victory for Investors,
INVESTMENTNEWS, Jan. 6, 2013, http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20130106/ 
REG/301069988/deal-on-dividend-tax-is-small-victory-for-investors; Tony Nitti, 
Obamacare Investment Income: A Downloadable Cheat Sheet, FORBES, Jan. 6, 2013, 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/anthonynitti/2012/12/06/cheat-sheets-to-the-obamacare-
investment-income-tax-regulations-a-downloadable-pdf/; Hibah Yousuf, Dividend 
Tax Hike ‘Could Have Been Worse,’ CNNMONEY, Jan. 2, 2013, 
http://money.cnn.com/2013/01/02/investing/fiscal-cliff-dividend-tax-rate/. 
Additionally, the Obama Administration’s proposals to directly limit interest 
deductibility echo the suggestions of several tax commentators. See generally Lucas 
W. Goodman & Robert C. Pozen, Capping the Deductibility of Corporate Interest 
Expense, 137 TAX NOTES 1207 (Dec. 10, 2012); Calvin H. Johnson, Corporate 
Meltdowns and the Deduction of Credit-Risk Interest, 131 TAX NOTES 513 (May 2, 
2011); Martin A. Sullivan, Economic Analysis: Treat Corporate Interest Deductions 
Like Any Tax Expenditure, 136 TAX NOTES 631 (Aug. 6, 2012). 
7. See Ezra Klein, Tax Reform Is Really, Really Hard, WASH. POST BLOG,
Feb 22, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/ezra-klein/wp/2012/08/10/tax-
reform-is-going-to-be-really-really-hard/; Daniel Shaviro, How Would the 
“President’s Framework for Corporate Tax Reform” Pay for Cutting the Corporate 
Rate? START MAKING SENSE BLOG (Feb. 23, 2012), 
http://danshaviro.blogspot.com/2012/02/how-would-presidents-framework-for.html; 
NYT Editorial, Reform and Corporate Taxes, supra note 4. 
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Was the favorable treatment of debt a product of the political influence of 
business and financial interests? Was the unfavorable treatment of equity due 
to equalitarian efforts to redistribute wealth? Did the distinction necessarily 
result from any specific political agenda? Is it even possible to pinpoint exactly 
when and how the distinction first arose? 
In general, existing scholarship has not addressed these questions. 
Although the debt-equity distinction has been the focus of considerable 
academic attention, few policy-oriented scholars have examined the issue’s 
history.8 Economists, reflecting their disciplinary training and expertise, tend 
to evaluate policies as givens, rather than considering their historical contexts. 
Economic studies of the debt-equity distinction have therefore focused on its 
effects rather than its causes.9 Applied policy research produced by the federal 
government and other nonacademic institutions is particularly ahistorical—
many of these sources recommend reform, but provide no insight into why the 
current system exists.10 For their part, legal scholars have taken a greater 
interest in the political aspects of the distinction, but they have generally 
focused on its contemporary persistence, without accounting for its historical 
                                                     
8. This is despite recognition that history matters for understanding 
current policy structures. Ilan Benshalom, for example, has suggested that better 
appreciation of the origins of tax rules could lead to better contemporary policy 
analysis. Regarding the debt-equity distinction, he describes the current state of affairs 
as follows:  
Arbitrary distinctions, such as the debt-equity distinction, have little 
if any justification for why they should be enforced but for the fact 
that they are “in the Code.” With this type of shaky why, it is no 
wonder that practitioners devote most of their time to questions of 
how, while academics find it more attractive to solve abstract 
problems with intellectually “cleaner” solutions. 
Benshalom, How to Live with a Tax Code, supra note 3. 
9. This characterization applies to the vast majority of economic 
scholarship on the issue, much of which is technical in nature. For a review of the 
literature, see Graham, A Review of Taxes, supra note 2. 
10. See, e.g., PRESIDENT’S BUSINESS TAX REFORM, supra note 6; RUUD A.
DE MOOIJ, INTL. MONETARY FUND, TAX BIASES TO DEBT FINANCE: ASSESSING THE 
PROBLEM, FINDING SOLUTIONS (2011); STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAX’N, JCX-41-11, 
PRESENT LAW AND BACKGROUND RELATING TO TAX TREATMENT OF BUSINESS DEBT
(2011); DEP’T OF TREASURY, TREASURY CONFERENCE ON BUSINESS TAXATION AND 
GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS (2007); ; OFFICE OF TAX POLICY, DEP’T OF TREASURY,
APPROACHES TO IMPROVE THE COMPETITIVENESS OF THE U.S. BUSINESS TAX SYSTEM 
FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (2007); THE PRESIDENT’S ADVISORY PANEL ON FEDERAL TAX 
REFORM, SIMPLE, FAIR, AND PRO-GROWTH: PROPOSALS TO FIX AMERICA’S TAX 
SYSTEM (2005); Michael Keen, Alexander Klemm & Victoria Perry, Tax and the 
Crisis, 31 FISC. STUD. 43 (2010). 
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origins.11 Such causal explanations as do exist in the literature rely more on 
reasoned speculation than empirical evidence. Jennifer Arlen and Deborah 
Weiss, for example, have suggested that lobbying by financial companies may 
explain the existence of interest deductibility.12 Barry Adler has written that 
interest deductibility may be the result of lobbying more generally, with the 
tacit approval of the taxpaying public.13 Katherine Pratt has ascribed the debt-
equity distinction to a historical, individualistic conception of debtor-creditor 
relations, under which interest was considered a legitimate business expense, 
but dividend payments were not.14 Given their focus on contemporary policy 
issues, none of these authors support their explanations with primary historical 
evidence.
This Article takes a different approach. Rather than conducting a 
normative assessment of the debt-equity distinction as it exists today, it seeks 
to explain how and why the distinction became law in the first place. 
Answering this question represents an important contribution to the literature, 
as no scholar of any discipline has provided an adequate account of the 
policy’s origins. Indeed, if tax scholars are guilty of neglecting history, 
historians are equally guilty of neglecting taxes—few historians have written 
on fiscal history, and fewer still have delved into the specific details of tax 
                                                     
11. See Jennifer Arlen & Deborah M. Weiss, A Political Theory of 
Corporate Taxation, 105 YALE L.J. 325 (1995) [hereinafter Arlen & Weiss, A Political 
Theory] for a commonly cited analysis of the contemporary politics of the debt-equity 
distinction. See also Barry E. Adler, Financial and Political Theories of American 
Corporate Bankruptcy, 45 STAN. L. REV. 311, 345–46 (1993) [hereinafter Adler, 
American Corporate Bankruptcy]; Benshalom, How to Live with a Tax Code, supra
note 3, at 1238–45; Yariv Brauner, Integration in an Integrating World, 2 N.Y.U. J.L.
& BUS. 51, 53 n.12 (2005); Michael Doran, Managers, Shareholders, and the 
Corporate Double Tax, 95 VA. L. REV. 517, 528–35 (2009); Anthony P. Polito, 
Advancing to Corporate Tax Integration: A Laissez-Faire Approach, 55 S.C. L. REV.
1, 34–36 (2003). Articles address the debt-equity distinction’s history rarely devote 
more than a few pages to the discussion of its history. See, e.g., Benshalom, How to 
Live with a Tax Code, supra note 3, at 1240–43; Curtis Jay Berger, Simple Interest 
and Complex Taxes, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 217, 218–22 (1981) [hereinafter Berger, 
Simple Interest]; Emmerich, Hybrid Instruments, supra note 3, at 121–28; Jeffrey L. 
Kwall, The Uncertain Case Against the Double Taxation of Corporate Income, 68 
N.C. L. REV. 613, 618–20 (1990) [hereinafter Kwall, The Uncertain Case]; Pratt, 
Second-Best World, supra note 3, at 1094–98; Alvin C. Warren, Jr., The Corporate 
Interest Deduction: A Policy Evaluation, 83 YALE L.J. 1585, 1585–86 (1974) 
[hereinafter Warren, The Corporate Interest Deduction].
12. Arlen & Weiss, A Political Theory, supra note 11, at 354 n.163. 
13. Adler, American Corporate Bankruptcy, supra note 11, at 346. 
14. Pratt, Second-Best World, supra note 3, at 1065–67. 
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law.15 The result of this neglect is that the origins of many long-standing tax 
principles, including the debt-equity distinction, are poorly understood. 
An important exception is the work of Steven Bank, who has written 
extensively on the history of corporate tax law. Of particular significance is 
Bank’s work on the rise of “double taxation”—the feature of U.S. tax law by 
which corporate profits are taxed at both the corporate and individual 
shareholder levels.16 Since dividend payments, unlike interest, are not 
deductible by corporations for tax purposes, double taxation can be thought of 
as the equity side of the debt-equity distinction.17 Bank’s work in this area has 
been an important influence on my own research, and indeed, this Article 
supports many of his findings.  
My contribution is distinct from Bank’s in important respects, 
however. Most significantly, I redirect attention to the origins of interest 
deductibility, while Bank’s work has emphasized the tax treatment of equity. 
I also rely somewhat less than Bank on the agency theory framework of 
corporate governance scholarship. Finally, I pay greater attention to how 
changes in the historical context, including broad shifts in the American 
political landscape, transformative economic developments, and unanticipated 
fiscal crises (such as war, depression, and other exogenous fiscal shocks), 
imposed a wide array of shifting and often contradictory pressures on U.S. tax 
policy. 
Specifically, this Article argues that the debt-equity distinction is the 
unintended consequence of an extended series of discrete, reactive, short-term 
political decisions, rather than the intentional realization of any broader policy 
goal. Each such decision was influenced by prior decisions, imparting a 
                                                     
15. Among current historians of taxation, W. Elliot Brownlee and Joseph 
Thorndike are perhaps the most prominent. While valuable, their work has generally 
focused on broad policy developments rather than specific legal rules. See, e.g., W.
ELLIOT BROWNLEE, FEDERAL TAXATION IN AMERICA: A SHORT HISTORY (2d ed. 
2004) [hereinafter BROWNLEE, A SHORT HISTORY]; FUNDING THE MODERN 
AMERICAN STATE, 1941–1995: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE ERA OF EASY FINANCE,
(W. Elliot Brownlee ed., 1996); TAX JUSTICE: THE ONGOING DEBATE, (Joseph J. 
Thorndike & Dennis J. Ventry eds., 2002); JOSEPH J. THORNDIKE, THEIR FAIR SHARE:
TAXING THE RICH IN THE AGE OF FDR (2013). 
16. See STEVEN A. BANK, FROM SWORD TO SHIELD: THE TRANSFORMATION 
OF THE CORPORATE INCOME TAX, 1861 TO PRESENT (2010) [hereinafter BANK, SWORD
TO SHIELD]; Steven A. Bank, The Story of Double Taxation: A Clash Over the Control 
of Corporate Earnings, in BUSINESS TAX STORIES 153 (Steven A. Bank & Kirk J. 
Stark eds., 2005) [hereinafter Bank, The Story of Double Taxation]; Steven A. Bank, 
Corporate Managers, Agency Costs, and the Rise of Double Taxation, 44 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 167 (2002) [hereinafter Bank, Corporate Managers].
17. Bank has also addressed the debt side of the distinction in a recent 
symposium essay. See Steven A. Bank, Historical Perspective on the Corporate 
Interest Deduction, 18 CHAP. L. REV. 29 (2014). 
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distinctly path-dependent character to the process’s eventual outcome. Due to 
the significant inertia of tax policy, decisions made in response to specific 
historical circumstances became difficult to change—even after the 
circumstances themselves changed or were no longer relevant. Through an 
essentially undirected process, the debt-equity distinction became an 
important feature of U.S. tax law without ever representing a coherent policy 
objective. As discussed in the conclusion, this process has important 
implications for our present understanding of the diverse and often contingent 
forces that have shaped the U.S. tax system. 
This Article begins with the Civil War and the enactment of the first 
U.S. income tax and concludes with the establishment of full double taxation 
of dividends in the late 1930s. This roughly 80-year period encompasses the 
debt-equity distinction’s origins and early development. Although the 
distinction has persisted throughout the postwar era, I have limited the scope 
of my analysis to the distinction’s formative years, as its more recent history 
has already received considerable attention in the legal literature. My focus 
throughout is on the legislative politics that led to specific statutory 
developments, as well as the social and economic contexts that shaped the 
broader legislative agenda.18
This Article proceeds as follows: Part II addresses the temporary 
income taxes enacted in the nineteenth century, prior to the establishment of a 
permanent federal income tax system. This part focuses in particular on the 
emerging concept of net income and the attendant deductibility of business 
expenses. Part III explores statutory developments from 1909 to 1939, the 
period in which the debt-equity distinction became a permanent feature of U.S. 
tax law. Spanning World War I and the Great Depression, these were the 
formative years of U.S. corporate taxation. Part IV concludes, assessing the 
broader significance of the debt-equity distinction’s history to the limits and 
possibilities of American tax reform. 
II. HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS:
THE CIVIL WAR INCOME TAX AND THE INCOME TAX OF 1894 
The United States government’s first permanent income tax—initially 
imposed only on corporations—was enacted by Congress in 1909.19
                                                     
18. By and large, this Article does not focus on judicial decisions. Since 
many of the notable decisions in this area attempted to delineate debt from equity in 
terms of a preexisting statutory distinction, the scope of this Article is limited to the 
evolution of the statutes themselves in the interest of concision. 
19. An Act to provide revenue, equalize duties and encourage the industries 
of the United States, and for other purposes, Pub. L. No. 61-5, § 38, 36 Stat. 11, 112–
17 (1909) [hereinafter 1909 Act to provide revenue]. Although Congress characterized 
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Following ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment in 1913,20 which 
specifically permitted income taxation without apportionment among the 
states, Congress expanded the income tax to include personal income as 
well.21 Income taxation, both corporate and personal, has been a cornerstone 
of the U.S. tax system ever since, and many of the Internal Revenue Code’s 
defining features can be traced to the legislation of the early twentieth century. 
The first permanent income tax and the Sixteenth Amendment were 
not the federal government’s first efforts at income taxation, however. 
Congress had enacted income taxes twice before in American history.22 To 
help finance the Civil War, Congress enacted an income tax for the first time 
in 1861,23 which remained in effect with various modifications until its repeal 
in 1871.24 Despite repeated calls for reinstatement, the federal government did 
without an income tax until 1894, when a broad coalition of equalitarian 
political interests were able to win its return.25 This victory was short-lived, 
however, as the Supreme Court struck down the 1894 tax as unconstitutional 
within a year of its enactment.26
Despite the gaps in time between the nineteenth-century income taxes 
and the permanent system established in the period between 1909 and 1913, 
these earlier laws established important precedents for the subsequent tax 
                                                     
this tax as a special excise tax on corporate profits, it was a corporate income tax for 
all intents and purposes. 
20. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI. 
21. An Act to reduce tariff duties and to provide revenue for the 
Government, and for other purposes, Pub. L. No. 63-16, §§ II.A–F, 38 Stat. 114, 166–
71 (1913) [hereinafter 1913 Act to reduce tariff duties and provide revenue]. 
22. Several states, including North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, 
Virginia, and Wisconsin, had also previously experimented with income taxation. As 
of the enactment of the federal individual income tax in 1913, the only state income 
tax of any significance was that of Wisconsin, enacted in 1911. EDWIN R. A.
SELIGMAN, THE INCOME TAX: A STUDY OF THE HISTORY, THEORY, AND PRACTICE OF 
INCOME TAXATION AT HOME AND ABROAD 388–429 (1911) [hereinafter SELIGMAN,
A STUDY OF THE INCOME TAX]. The Wisconsin income tax, which became a model 
for income taxes adopted in other states, was enacted as Act of Jul. 15, 1911, ch. 658, 
1911 Wisc. Session Laws 984. Surprisingly, the 1911 Wisconsin tax does not appear 
to have featured in the Congressional debates leading to the 1913 federal tax. 
23. An Act to provide increased Revenue from Imports, to pay Interest on 
the Public Debt, and for other Purposes, § 49, 12 Stat. 292, 309 (1861). 
24. An Act to reduce internal Taxes, and for other Purposes, § 6, 16 Stat. 
256, 257 (1870) provided that 1871 would be the final year of the income tax. 
25. An Act to reduce taxation, to provide revenue for the government, and 
for other purposes, §§ 27–33, 28 Stat. 509, 553–57 (1894). 
26. As discussed infra, text at note 130, the Supreme Court struck down the 
tax on the grounds that it violated the apportionment requirement of U.S. CONT. art. 
1, § 2. Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895). 
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treatment of debt and equity. Significantly, the nineteenth-century tax laws 
occasioned Congress’s first engagement with what is perhaps the fundamental 
conceptual problem of income taxation: What, exactly, is “income”? The 
resolution of this question in the nineteenth century would establish the 
framework for all future tax laws, conditioning the treatment of interest and 
dividends under the twentieth-century corporate income tax. 
A. The Civil War Revenue Acts and the Meaning of Income 
The Civil War gave rise to the federal government’s first experiments 
with income taxation. Prior to the war, the government raised the majority of 
its revenue through import tariffs.27 While sufficient to fund the national 
government’s modest peacetime expenditures, tariffs were seen as inadequate 
to meet the unprecedented cost of war mobilization.28 In addition, tariff 
revenue was vulnerable to wartime disruptions to foreign trade, increasing the 
importance of securing additional sources of government income.29
Republican legislators, who dominated both houses of the Union Congress, 
believed a new tax based on individual income could help solve the North’s 
sudden fiscal challenges. Together with tariff increases, excise taxes, and new 
direct taxes on real property (apportioned among the states), the country’s first 
income tax was adopted August 5, 1861.30
                                                     
27. See F. W. TAUSSIG, THE TARIFF HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 
63?133 (5th ed. 2010). 
28. In the century and a half following the Civil War, federal spending as a 
percentage of the U.S. economy has increased significantly. Federal spending as a 
percentage of GDP was approximately 1.7 percent in 1859; the same figure was 
approximately 20.8 percent in 2013. John Joseph Wallis, Federal Government 
Finances—Revenue, Expenditure, and Debt: 1789?1939, table Ea584?587 in
HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES, EARLIEST TIMES TO THE PRESENT:
MILLENNIAL EDITION (Susan B. Carter et al. eds., 2006); Office of Mgmt. & Budget, 
Table 15.3—Total Government Expenditures as Percentages of GDP: 1948–2013,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/budget/fy2015/assets/hist15z3.xl
s (last visited Oct. 5, 2015). See also BROWNLEE, A SHORT HISTORY, supra note 15, 
at 31. 
29. BANK, SWORD TO SHIELD, supra note16, at 12; ROY G. BLAKEY &
GLADYS C. BLAKEY, THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 2 (1940) [hereinafter BLAKEY &
BLAKEY, THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX]; SELIGMAN, A STUDY OF THE INCOME TAX,
supra note 22, at 430–34; JOHN WITTE, THE POLITICS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE 
FEDERAL INCOME TAX 67 (1985) [hereinafter WITTE, POLITICS AND DEVELOPMENT]. 
30. The revised tariffs, excise taxes, direct taxes, and income tax were all 
included within 1861 Act to increase Revenue, supra note 23. As discussed infra Part 
I.A, the 1861 income tax was never collected, being superseded by replacement 
legislation in 1862. The Confederacy, facing a similar fiscal crisis, adopted its own 
income tax in 1863. William D. Samson, The Nineteenth Century Income Tax in the 
South, 12 ACCOUNT. HIST. J., Spring 1985, at 37, 44–48. 
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Unlike today, the Civil War income tax applied only to the income of 
individuals, not the profits of corporations. Under the 1861 Act, the tax was to 
be levied as 3 percent of the annual income, in excess of $800, of “every person 
residing in the United States.”31 Corporations and other business entities were 
not obligated to pay taxes on profits).32 Beginning in 1862, the government 
levied a withholding tax equal to the individual income tax on interest and 
dividends paid by businesses in certain industries. The income targeted by this 
withholding tax was the income of individuals, not the profits of corporations 
as entities separate from their investors.33 Corporations and other businesses 
subject to the withholding tax merely served as collection points. At the time, 
the perceived injustice of double taxation—taxing income at the corporate 
level and then again at the individual level—was a sensitive political issue, 
which Congress sought to avoid by allowing individual taxpayers to deduct 
interest and dividends subject to the withholding tax from their personal 
                                                     
31. 1861 Act to increase Revenue, supra note 23, at § 49, 12 Stat. 292, 309. 
In subsequent years, the 3 percent rate would increase and the $800 exemption would 
decrease. For comparison, the relative value of $800 in 1861 would be $21,800 in 
2013, based on changes in the consumer price index (CPI). Seven Ways to Compute 
the Relative Value of a U.S. Dollar Amount - 1774 to Present,
MEASURINGWORTH.COM, http://www.measuringworth.com/uscompare/ (last visited 
Nov. 26, 2014) [hereinafter Seven Ways to Compute U.S. Dollar Amount]
32. For a summary of the 1861 Act’s key provisions, see infra Appendix 
row 1.  
33. An Act to provide Internal Revenue to support the Government and to 
pay Interest on the Public Debt, §§ 81–82, 12 Stat. 432, 469–70 (1862) [hereinafter 
1862 Act to provide Internal Revenue to support the Government] imposed a 3 percent 
withholding tax on interest and dividends paid by transportation companies, as well 
as on dividends (but not interest) paid by financial and insurance companies. An Act 
to provide Internal Revenue to support the Government, pay Interest on the Public 
Debt, and for other Purposes, §§ 117, 120–22, 13 Stat. 223, 281–82, 283–85 (1864) 
[hereinafter 1864 Act to support the Government and pay Interest on Public Debt] 
allowed individual taxpayers to deduct interest and dividends subject to withholding 
tax from their personal income, imposed individual income tax on certain business 
profits, whether divided or otherwise, imposed a 5 percent withholding tax on interest 
and dividends paid by transportation companies, and imposed a 5 percent withholding 
tax on dividends (but not interest) paid by financial and insurance companies. See
BLAKEY & BLAKEY, THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX, supra note 29, at 5; SELIGMAN, A
STUDY OF THE INCOME TAX, supra note 22, at 444; Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, 
Corporations, Society, and the State: A Defense of the Corporate Tax, 90 VA. L. REV.
1193, 1219–20 (2004) [hereinafter Avi-Yonah, A Defense of the Corporate Tax]; cf.
BANK, SWORD TO SHIELD, supra note 16, at 5 (arguing that although Congress 
purposefully avoided double taxation, the Civil War tax laws planted the seeds of a 
separate corporate income tax). 
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income.34 This deduction was meant to ensure that taxes withheld from 
interest and dividend payments were not duplicated when individual investors 
filed their personal tax returns.35
Despite the absence of a separate corporate income tax, the Civil War 
revenue acts had important consequences for the subsequent tax treatment of 
corporate debt and equity. Congress’s experience with these early income tax 
laws first gave rise to the concept of net income, inspiring the deduction 
system familiar to us today. Since the tax distinction between debt and equity 
is predicated on the existence of interest deductibility, the emergence of a net 
conception of income was central to the distinction’s later development. 
When the income tax was first enacted, the precise meaning of 
“income” was unclear. Under the 1861 Act, the 3 percent tax applied to “the 
annual income of every person residing in the United States, whether such 
income is derived from any kind of property, or from any profession, trade, 
employment, or vocation carried on in the United States or elsewhere[.]”36 The 
word “income” was not defined in the statute, however, and national, state, 
and local taxes were the only specified deductions.37 This left considerable 
ambiguity as to whether the law’s purpose was to tax gross income (all revenue 
received by the taxpayer) or net income (revenue received by the taxpayer, 
minus associated costs and expenses). 
                                                     
34. 1862 Act to provide Internal Revenue to support the Government, supra
note 33, at § 91, 12 Stat. 432, 473–74; 1864 Act to support the Government and pay 
Interest on Public Debt, supra note 33, at § 117, 13 Stat. 223, 281–82. 
35. Integration of the withholding and individual-level taxes was imperfect, 
however, in that the withholding tax was set at a flat rate that did not take into account 
the standard personal exemption. This inconsistency was likely due to limitations in 
the design and administration of the tax laws, rather than specific Congressional intent. 
BANK, SWORD TO SHIELD, supra note 16, at 7–8. To illustrate the relative scale of 
these taxes, in fiscal year 1864, the withholding tax on interest and dividends 
amounted to $5,277,141.07, approximately 24 percent of all income tax revenues and 
nearly 5 percent of internal revenue from all sources. In fiscal year 1865, withholding 
tax on interest and dividends increased to $8,070,367.53, nearly 26 percent of all 
income tax revenues and approximately 4 percent of internal revenue from all sources. 
Withholding tax on interest and dividends represented a much larger percentage of 
income tax revenues in fiscal year 1863—approximately 62 percent—as the 
administrative infrastructure for collecting income tax directly from individuals was 
not yet fully in place. See TREASURY DEP’T, REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF 
INTERNAL REVENUE ON THE OPERATIONS OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE SYSTEM FOR 
THE YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1865 (1865); TREASURY DEP’T, REPORT OF THE 
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE ON THE OPERATIONS OF THE INTERNAL 
REVENUE SYSTEM FOR THE YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1864 (1864); TREASURY DEP’T,
REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE ON THE OPERATIONS OF THE 
INTERNAL REVENUE SYSTEM FOR THE YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1863 (1863). 
36. 1861 Act to increase Revenue, supra note 23, at § 49, 12 Stat. 292, 309. 
37. Id
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The 1861 Congressional debates leading to the tax’s enactment 
suggest that although certain deductions were implied, the exact scope of 
allowable deductions was intentionally left unclear. Senator James Simmons, 
a Republican from Rhode Island who introduced the tax bill in the Senate, 
warned against what he considered the disadvantages of specifying 
deductions. When questioned as to whether “income” meant gross or net 
income for purposes of the tax bill, Simmons responded that “income” was 
intended to mean “net profits,” but that specific determinations as to exactly 
which expenses were or were not deductible were best left to the Treasury 
Department, which was charged with the tax’s enforcement.38 According to 
Simmons, express use of the term “net income” within the language of the 
statute would open the door for taxpayers to claim spurious deductions.39
Referring to a hypothetical storehouse owner, Simmons explained: 
If I put in the word “net” income, he would try to have 
all the repairs, and so on, deducted, and would make them 
amount to as much as the income. That would be the trouble. 
When a man repairs his buildings, he will have less income 
that year, because he spends it in repairing. I thought of 
putting this word “net” in; but I could see so many ways of 
evading it that I thought it better to let the Secretary of the 
Treasury prescribe his rules, and let the bill cover all 
incomes.40
Other Senators disagreed, feeling the meaning of the law should be as 
clear as possible. For example, Senator Daniel Clark, a Republican from New 
Hampshire, submitted an amendment to insert the word “net” before the word 
“income,” but his proposal was voted down 18-10 in floor debate.41
Ultimately, Senator Simmons’s preference for ambiguity prevailed, as 
reflected in the final language of the law. The meaning of income under the 
1861 Act was never subjected to practical interpretation, however. In the first 
of many revisions to the Civil War tax laws, a superseding revenue act was 
signed July 1, 1862, before the 1861 Act was put in force.42
                                                     
38. CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 1st Sess. 315 (1861). 
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. The 1861 tax was to be payable June 30, 1862, but the Secretary of the 
Treasury, Salmon Chase, advised that enforcement of the tax be deferred, as 
“numerous questions will certainly perplex its assessment and collection.” SELIGMAN,
A STUDY OF THE INCOME TAX, supra note 22, at 435–36. The superseding 1862 tax 
was enacted as 1862 Act to provide Internal Revenue to support the Government, 
supra note 33. 
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Under the 1862 Act, the income tax continued to apply to 
individuals—“every person residing in the United States”—and was now 
imposed at 3 percent of income exceeding $600 (unless the taxpayer’s income 
exceeded $10,000, in which case the rate increased to 5 percent of income 
exceeding $600).43 Presumably, the Act’s reference to “every person residing 
in the United States” limited its application to individuals, although a separate 
section of the act confused the matter by defining “person” to include 
“partnerships, firms, associations, or corporations.”44 The Commissioner of 
Internal Revenue, charged with enforcing the tax, resolved this ambiguity by 
determining that the income tax applied to individuals only.45 Although the 
tax was not applied to corporations or other business entities as such, under 
the 1862 Act, certain corporate interest and dividend payments became subject 
to a 3 percent withholding tax.46 To avoid double taxation, these payments 
were correspondingly deductible from the taxable income of individual 
investors.47
                                                     
43. 1862 Act to provide Internal Revenue to support the Government, supra
note 33, at § 90, 12 Stat. 432. For comparison, based on changes in the CPI, the relative 
value of $600 in 1862 would be $14,300 in 2013, while the relative value of $10,000 
would be $239,000. Seven Ways to Compute U.S. Dollar Amount, supra note 31. 
Unlike the 1861 Act, which explicitly referred to an “income tax,” the corresponding 
section of the 1862 Act referred instead to an income “duty.” Why Congress chose to 
use the word “duty” in the 1862 version is unclear, but “duty” was changed back to 
“tax” in 1867. An Act to amend existing Laws relating to Internal Revenue, and for 
other Purposes, § 13, 14 Stat. 471, 481–82 (1867) [hereinafter 1867 Act to amend 
Laws relating to Internal Revenue]. 
44. 1862 Act to provide Internal Revenue to support the Government, supra
note 33, at § 68, 12 Stat. 432, 459–60. Although a literal reading of this section might 
suggest that every reference to “person” in the 1862 Act included “partnerships, firms, 
associations, or corporations,” the broader statutory framework would have made such 
an interpretation difficult to sustain. 
45. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued the following decision 
in the spring of 1863: “The income tax is assessed upon the actual income of 
individuals. Firms, as such, will not make returns.” Comm’r of Internal Revenue, No. 
110, Relative to the assessment of the income tax (May 1863) reprinted in GEORGE 
SEWALL BOUTWELL, A MANUAL OF THE DIRECT AND EXCISE TAX SYSTEM OF THE 
UNITED STATES 275 (1863) [hereinafter BOUTWELL, A MANUAL]. 
46. 1862 Act to provide Internal Revenue to support the Government, supra
note 33, at §§ 81–82, 12 Stat. 432, 469–70. 
47. 1862 Act to provide Internal Revenue to support the Government, supra
note 33, at § 91, 12 Stat. 432, 473–74; see infra Appendix row 2. The salaries of federal 
employees (including elected officials) also became subject to a 3 percent withholding 
tax on amounts in excess of $600 and were fully deductible from such employees’ 
personal tax returns. 1862 Act to provide Internal Revenue to support the Government, 
supra note 33, at § 86, 12 Stat. 432, 472. 
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For the most part, the phraseology of the 1861 Act was carried over to 
the 1862 Act, with one significant difference: the 1862 Act replaced the term 
“income” with the broader phrase “gains, profits, or income.”48 Although this 
broader language more strongly suggested a net income concept, ambiguity 
persisted, as reflected in the disagreement that characterized the 1862 
legislative debates. Some members of Congress believed the meaning of 
“gains, profits, or income” was self-evident, and that further elaboration would 
only dilute the statute.49 Others argued that the meaning of “gains, profits, or 
income” was ambiguous, and that express use of the words “net income” was 
a necessary clarification.50 Although opponents of the term “net income” 
claimed to agree, in principle, that taxpayers should be allowed to deduct 
expenses from taxable income, such claims may have been disingenuous, as 
opposition to the term seems to have been motivated largely by a desire to 
limit deductions and thereby maximize revenue.51 For example, despite having 
earlier acknowledged that “gains, profits, or income” meant net income, 
Representative Justin Morrill, a Republican from Vermont, specifically 
opposed the deductibility of mortgage interest.52
This issue of mortgage interest received particularly close attention 
from Congress. By the 1860s, the westward expansion of American 
agriculture was creating unprecedented growth in mortgage lending, as more 
and more farmers purchased farmland with loans secured by the underlying 
property.53 Mortgage loans were fast becoming one of the most common 
forms of personal debt, and it is therefore unsurprising they featured 
prominently in Congressional debates. Tellingly, some of the same lawmakers 
who advocated a less precise definition of income also argued that mortgage 
payments should not be allowable as deductions.54 As was often the case in 
nineteenth-century tax politics, there appears to have been a regional cast to 
these debates, with western agricultural states favoring interest deductibility 
and wealthier northeastern states opposing it.55 In an exchange in the House 
                                                     
48. 1862 Act to provide Internal Revenue to support the Government, supra
note 33, at § 90, 12 Stat. 432, 473. 
49. See CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1531–32 (1862). 
50. Id.
51. Id. at 1531–32, 2486–87. 
52. See id. at 1531–32. 
53. For discussion of the nineteenth-century rise of the national mortgage 
market, see Jonathan Levy, The Mortgage Worked the Hardest, in CAPITALISM TAKES 
COMMAND: THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 39 
(Gary J. Kornblith & Michael Zakim eds., 2010). 
54. See CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1531–32 (1862). 
55. See BLAKEY & BLAKEY, THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX, supra note 29, at 
4; BROWNLEE, A SHORT HISTORY, supra note 15, at 46–47; SELIGMAN, A STUDY OF 
THE INCOME TAX, supra note 22, at 506–08, 520–21. 
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of Representatives, Representative Owen Lovejoy of Illinois and 
Representative Steven White of Indiana proposed an amendment specifying 
that “income” meant “net income.” Representatives Justin Morrill of Vermont 
and Thaddeus Stevens of Pennsylvania opposed the measure. Illustrating the 
tensions between the western and northeastern states, Stevens criticized the 
proposal in the following terms: 
I oppose the amendment of the gentleman from 
Indiana. The income tax, as a general rule, will be almost 
exclusively collected from the large cities. The country, and 
especially the western country, will not pay a millionth part 
of it. If the present amendment prevails, they will not pay any 
part of it.56
In addition to revealing regional frictions, these debates suggest that, 
from the income tax’s earliest beginnings, some lawmakers were already 
concerned with the use of deductions as an avoidance measure. 
Other lawmakers also opposed inclusion of a specific mortgage 
interest deduction, but for essentially the opposite reason—they believed the 
phrase “gains, profits, or income” clearly entailed the deduction of mortgage 
interest and feared specifying particular deductions might imply the 
disallowance of others.57 Following a rather confused debate, the “gains, 
profits, or income” phraseology (without the word “net”) prevailed in the 
House, but not all representatives agreed that the final language was 
sufficiently precise. Upon assurances from colleagues that “gains, profits, or 
income” meant net income, an unsatisfied Lovejoy responded: “All I have to 
say is, that some of the best lawyers in the House understand income to be the 
gross income.”58
These disagreements notwithstanding, most members of Congress 
probably did understand “gains, profits, or income” to mean net income, as 
this was the meaning most often articulated in the official record. According 
to Senator John Sherman, future Treasury Secretary and original sponsor of 
the Sherman Antitrust Act, the word “income” was widely understood to mean 
net income, both as a practical and legal matter. Conceding that the word 
“income” had not yet received definitive construction in American law, 
Sherman argued that the term had a well-established meaning in commercial 
practice and under the law of England, and that in both contexts, expenses—
                                                     
56. CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1531 (1862). Representatives 
Lovejoy, White, Morrill, and Stevens were all Republicans. Given the dominance of 
the Republican Party, regional differences were often of greater political significance 
than party differences. 
57. Id. at 1531?32, 2486?87. 
58. Id. at 1532. 
2015]  The Historical Origins of the Debt-Equity Distinction 111
including interest—were always deducted to arrive at income.59 A 
contemporary analysis of the 1862 Act in the Daily National Intelligencer 
supported the “net income” interpretation. Citing dictionary definitions of the 
words “gains,” “profits,” and “income,” the article concluded that while the 
term “income” could be construed literally to mean all revenue that “comes 
in,” the addition of the narrower terms “gains” and “profits” to form the phrase 
“gains, profits, or income” weighed in favor of a net concept.60
Similar to the question of the meaning of the term “person,” the 
ambiguity of “gains, profits, or income” was ultimately resolved at the 
administrative level when the income tax was assessed and collected by the 
newly formed Bureau of Internal Revenue. Faced with the practical problem 
of how to measure taxable income, the Bureau chose to assess the tax on a net 
basis. Its standard income tax return form, published and distributed for use 
by taxpayers, explicitly provided for the deduction of business expenses, 
maintenance expenses, insurance expenses, mortgage interest, and rent.61
Letter rulings issued by the Bureau in 1863 emphasized that “income tax is 
laid upon the net gains, after the expenses of conducting the business are 
deducted[,]”62 and that the rate of taxation was to be determined “after those 
deductions are made, which are in actual diminution of income, such as rents, 
taxes, repairs, losses, &c.”63 Moreover, an 1863 administrative decision of the 
Bureau ruled that “[i]nterest on borrowed capital used in business” was also 
deductible.64 Given the Bureau’s decisive construction of the law, the 
ambiguity of the statute had little practical significance. 
When Congress amended the income tax again in 1864, it followed 
the Bureau’s lead by addressing deductions explicitly and providing that labor 
costs, rent, and interest on mortgages were all deductible from taxable 
income.65 Taxpayers could also deduct interest on general, unsecured debt, but 
only up to the amount of interest they had received during the tax year.66 In 
addition, the 1864 amendments increased the income tax to a graduated rate 
of 5–10 percent and increased the withholding tax on corporate interest and 
                                                     
59. Id. at. 2487. 
60. The Income Tax, DAILY NAT’L INTELLIGENCER, Aug. 27, 1862, at 2. 
61. Form 24, reprinted in BOUTWELL, A MANUAL, supra note 45, at 155–
56. 
62. Ruling 23, reprinted in BOUTWELL, A MANUAL, supra note 45, at 304. 
63. Ruling 36, reprinted in BOUTWELL, A MANUAL, supra note 45, at 306. 
64. Decision 110, reprinted in BOUTWELL, A MANUAL, supra note 45, at 
275. 
65. 1864 Act to support the Government and pay Interest on Public Debt, 
supra note 33, at § 117, 13 Stat. 223, 281–82. 
66. Id.
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dividends to 5 percent.67 Regarding deductions from income, it is not entirely 
clear why––having avoided the issue in previous versions of the tax––
Congress chose to address deductions explicitly in 1864. The labor, rent, and 
interest deductions were included in the 1864 House bill without comment and 
were never amended (and apparently never discussed) as the bill moved 
through Congress on its way to enactment.68 It seems likely that Congress was 
simply conforming the law to the collection practice established by the Bureau, 
but given the lack of legislative discussion, the exact reasons remain unknown. 
Whatever the impetus, expense deductibility had now become an explicit 
feature of statutory tax law. 
The income tax remained in place following the conclusion of the 
Civil War, and its structural details continued to evolve at both the statutory 
and administrative levels. In 1867, Congress abandoned rate graduation and 
changed the tax to a flat 5 percent rate on income exceeding $1,000.69 More 
importantly, the interest deduction provision was substantially rewritten. 
Under the 1867 amendments, general, unsecured business interest became 
fully deductible, while the deductibility of non-business mortgage interest was 
repealed.70 In effect, interest deductibility now depended on whether the 
underlying debt was business-related, rather than on whether it was secured 
by a lien. Following this amendment, the Bureau ceased its former practice of 
allowing taxpayers to deduct interest on home mortgages.71
At the time, most interest-bearing debt in the American economy was, 
in fact, business-related. Mortgage loans were issued primarily for the 
purchase of farmland, which generated business income for tax purposes. 
                                                     
67. 1864 Act to support the Government and pay Interest on Public Debt, 
supra note 33, at §§ 116, 120, 122, 13 Stat. 223, 281, 283–84, 285–85; see infra
Appendix row 3. 
68. H.R. 405, 38th Cong. (1864). The revenue bill passed the House by a 
vote of 103-33 and the Senate by a vote of 28-3. The deduction provisions do not 
appear to have been controversial, as I have found no discussion of them in 
Congressional debates or contemporary news coverage. For vote count information, 
see The Vote on the Tax Bill, BOSTON DAILY ADVERTISER, Apr. 30, 1864, at 2. 
69. 1867 Act to amend Laws relating to Internal Revenue, at § 13, 14 Stat. 
471, 477–80. For comparison, the relative value of $1,000 in 1867 would be $16,200 
in 2013, based on changes in the CPI. Seven Ways to Compute U.S. Dollar Amount,
supra note 31. 
70. 1867 Act to amend Laws relating to Internal Revenue, at § 13, 14 Stat. 
471, 477–80. 
71. OFFICE OF INTERNAL REVENUE, INSTRUCTIONS TO UNITED STATES 
ASSESSORS: CONCERNING THE ASSESSMENT OF INCOMES AND SPECIAL TAXES FOR 
THE YEAR 1868, at 7 (1868); Mr. Delano on Taxation of Homestead Income, N.Y.
TIMES, March 28, 1870, at 1. 
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Personal non-business lending was mainly limited to store credit.72
Nevertheless, homestead mortgage lending––mortgage lending secured by a 
home, rather than farmland—which did not generate business income and was 
therefore no longer deductible under the Bureau’s collection practices, had 
become sufficiently widespread that the Bureau’s actions led to strong public 
criticism.73 Editorials in major newspapers and periodicals condemned “the 
weak and oppressive effort of the Internal Revenue Bureau to prohibit the 
deduction of interest paid on mortgages,”74 castigated the Bureau’s policies as 
lacking “justice or common sense,”75 and forewarned that “we are rapidly 
drifting toward a despotism in this matter of the income tax.”76
Perhaps in response, Congressional amendments to the tax laws in 
1870 eliminated any distinction between business and non-business interest, 
allowing taxpayers to deduct “the amount of interest paid during the year” 
without qualification.77 Strangely, the Bureau continued its practice of limiting 
full interest deductibility to business debt. According to Bureau regulations, 
interest on home mortgages and other non-business obligations was only 
deductible up to the amount of interest income received, which for most 
taxpayers meant not at all.78 This discrepancy between the statutory law and 
its administrative enforcement highlights the confusion and ambiguity that 
characterized the early income tax. It also illustrates the early conception of 
interest as a business expense, an association that would continue to influence 
later corporate tax policy. 
In addition to addressing the treatment of interest, the 1870 
amendments also provided for the income tax’s (temporary) repeal, limiting 
the tax’s effectiveness to the year 1871 “and no longer.”79 In the years 
following the conclusion of the war, the federal government’s fiscal situation 
had begun to improve, budget deficits had turned to surpluses, and the income 
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tax—always unpopular—was no longer considered necessary.80 So ended the 
federal government’s first experiment with income taxation, a revenue source 
that would remain dormant until the Populist movement of the 1890s. 
Although brief in duration, the Civil War income tax was of major importance 
to subsequent tax law. Two of its developments in particular—the 
establishment of a tax base grounded in the concept of net income and the 
designation of interest as a deductible business expense—would eventually 
become permanent features of the American tax system. 
B. The Income Tax of 1894 and the Advent of the Corporate Interest 
Deduction
Following the Civil War, the government returned to its previous 
reliance on import tariffs. Popular discontent with the tariff system would soon 
emerge as a major political issue, however. The postwar nineteenth century 
was a period of rapid economic development, but also of damaging financial 
panics, growing labor unrest, and increasingly salient income inequality.81
Amidst these sweeping economic changes, the politically dominant 
Republican Party’s tariff-centered fiscal policies drew increasing criticism. 
Many voters perceived high tariffs on manufactured and other imported goods 
as favoring northeastern industrial interests at the expense of American 
consumers. Although indirect taxes such as tariffs are generally less visible 
than direct taxes on income, U.S. tariffs were too high and too pervasive to 
escape public notice. Since tariffs increased the prices of imported goods, 
including basic necessities, and since the poor spent a greater proportion of 
income on consumption than the wealthy, the postwar tax system was highly 
regressive.82 Even consumers who avoided imported goods were effectively 
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taxed when they purchased competing domestic goods, the high prices of 
which were supported by tariffs. In addition to taxing imports, Republican 
fiscal policy also imposed high excise taxes on “sinful,” though highly 
popular, consumer goods such as alcohol and tobacco.83 Serving as the 
cornerstone of the Republican Party’s protectionist trade policy, these import 
and consumption taxes effected a substantial wealth transfer from consumers 
to producers.84
Popular dissatisfaction with tariff policy helped energize an 
increasingly competitive Democratic party, which rose to challenge 
Republican dominance in the 1880s and 1890s. Calls to reduce tariffs and 
reinstate a progressive income tax converged with populist demands for trade 
liberalization, restrictions on trusts, and an inflationary “free silver” monetary 
policy—all spurred by economic disaffection and increasingly visible 
concentrated wealth.85 Tax reform was a central plank of the Democratic Party 
Platform of 1892, which cast Republican tariff policy as “the culminating 
atrocity of class legislation.”86 The tariff issue helped Democrats win both 
houses of Congress in the elections of 1892.87 Following the Democrats’ 
victory, any remaining political resistance to a new income tax was 
undermined by the financial panic of 1893, which precipitated the worst 
depression the United States had experienced to date.88 Amidst a climate of 
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crisis and resentment, a broad coalition of Democrats and Progressives won 
passage of a new income tax in 1894.89 To its many supporters, the income 
tax was more than simply a revenue measure—its passage was also a symbolic 
victory over economic privilege and inequality.90
Initially, the income tax had been introduced in the House in January 
1894 by Representative Benton McMillin, as an amendment to the already 
pending 1894 revenue bill.91 As originally drafted, the tax generally followed 
its Civil War predecessor, with certain important structural differences. Unlike 
the Civil War tax, which had applied to personal income only, the 1894 Act 
taxed corporate profits separately from the income of individuals. Specifically, 
in addition to a 2 percent tax on the annual “gains, profits, and income” in 
excess of $4,000 of “every citizen of the United States,” it also imposed a 2 
percent tax on the annual “net profits or income above actual operating and 
business expenses” of all “corporations, companies, or associations,” 
excluding partnerships.92 To avoid double taxation, Congress allowed 
individuals to exclude dividends from taxable income.93 This shift to taxing 
corporations separately from individuals reflected the increasing significance 
of corporations in the American economy, as the prevalence of the corporate 
form had surged in the second half of the nineteenth century. Since more and 
more businesses were being organized as corporations, there were increasing 
practical advantages to taxing corporations directly.94
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Although the 1894 Act income tax seemed to entail an additional layer 
of taxation by taxing corporations directly, in substance it closely followed the 
Civil War system, which had imposed a withholding tax on dividend payments 
while exempting dividends from individual tax returns. Under both systems, 
corporate profits were generally taxed only once.95 Indeed, some scholars have 
argued that the 1894 corporate income tax actually targeted individual 
investors rather than corporations qua corporations, and was therefore merely 
a variation of taxation “at the source” (i.e., taxation paid at the entity level on 
behalf of diffuse taxpayers).96 This view—suggesting significant continuity 
between the Civil War withholding provisions and the 1894 corporate income 
tax—is supported by the statements of Democratic Senator George Vest of 
Missouri, a member of the Committee on Finance and one of the key architects 
of the 1894 Act:  
Instead of making the corporation a collector simply 
for the Government, we have endeavored to simplify the bill 
and, in my judgment, we have strengthened it, by putting the 
tax directly upon the corporation and then allowing the 
corporation to adjust its relations with its own stockholders as 
it sees proper.97
Viewed in this light, the decision to tax corporations directly was a 
matter of administrative convenience, and did not reflect a conception of 
corporations as economically distinct from their investors. 
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The finer details of the 1894 Act were shaped by the Congressional 
debates leading to its enactment. The taxation of corporate interest payments 
received particular attention from lawmakers. As originally drafted, the 
legislation provided no deductions from corporate income.98 An amendment 
supported by Vest, however, proposed that the corporate tax be calculated 
based on net earnings “above ordinary working or operating expenses.”99
While clarifying that the tax was to be calculated based on net income, this 
amendment also seemed to disallow the deduction of interest, which was 
generally considered a fixed expense rather than an operating expense.100
Members of Congress opposed to the income tax’s reintroduction seized on 
Vest’s amendment as one of several flaws warranting the tax’s rejection. 
Senator David Hill, a Democrat from New York and one of the income tax’s 
staunchest opponents, assailed the lack of corporate interest deductibility 
during a lengthy floor speech against the tax.101 According to Hill, disallowing 
the deduction of fixed charges such as interest was an injustice unprecedented 
in the history of taxation, amounting to “robbery under the form of law.”102
Invoking the recent financial crisis and the depressed state of the national 
economy, Hill warned that disallowing corporate interest deductions would 
“cripple, embarrass, and throw into receiverships hundreds of corporations 
now struggling for existence.”103
The day after Hill’s speech, Vest modified his proposal, offering 
language permitting corporations to deduct interest on “bonded 
indebtedness.”104 The reasons behind Vest’s shift are not entirely clear. While 
it may have been an effort to placate critics such as Hill, it also had the effect 
of angering the tax’s most fervent supporters. Many observers assumed the 
new language was a concession to the railroad industry, which was facing dire 
economic conditions in the wake of the financial panic.105 American railroad 
corporations were heavily reliant on bond financing, and high leverage led to 
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high rates of insolvency as revenues plunged and credit evaporated.106 Given 
the power and influence of the railroads, critics of Vest’s revision were quick 
to ascribe it to industry lobbying. Claiming that “a large assembly of railroad 
people” had visited Washington immediately prior to Vest’s proposal, Senator 
Eugene Hale, a Republican from Maine, characterized the amendment as “the 
surrender to the railroad corporations.”107 Populist Senator William Allen of 
Nebraska went further, alleging that a “certain railroad magnate” (he declined 
to specify who) had been invited to the Capitol Building and dictated tax 
policy directly to the Senate Finance Committee.108 For his part, Vest denied 
the accusations in full: 
I know nothing of any railroad people being assembled here. 
I have not seen any of them, except as I have seen people here 
every day for the last four months; but this amendment has 
not been made at the instigation of any corporation. I am 
under the influence of no corporation, and have no connection 
with any corporation; but we are endeavoring to make this bill 
upon just and equitable principles, and this was the result of 
consultation amongst the members of the committee.109
Since Vest’s discussions with the Finance Committee were never 
publicly reported, the true reasons for the revision—and the extent of railroad 
industry influence—remain unknown. Given the precarious financial 
environment and the massive debt overhang facing American business, 
however, it seems plausible that the solvency of large corporations (such as 
railroads) was an important consideration in the Finance Committee’s decision 
making. Indeed, before Vest’s revised language was even put to vote, 
Connecticut Republican Senator Oliver Platt suggested expanding the 
deduction from “bonded indebtedness” to cover all corporate debt, of whatever 
form.110 This change was quickly accepted, and deductibility of all interest on 
“bonded or other indebtedness” was incorporated into the final law.111
Deductibility of dividends was also a sensitive issue. As drafted, the 
1894 bill provided that individual income was taxable only to the extent it 
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exceeded $4,000 annually. Corporate income, however, enjoyed no 
corresponding exemption.112 This meant that while interest paid by 
corporations to individuals with incomes less than $4,000 was essentially tax 
free (being deductible at the corporate level and untaxed at the individual 
level), the payment of dividends to such “low income” investors remained 
subject to the corporate-level income tax. During the debates over the tax bill, 
many lawmakers sought to eliminate this disparity by allowing corporations 
to deduct a portion of their dividends. 
Discussion of this issue was strongly influenced by differing 
perceptions of bondholders and shareholders. In the early 1890s, large 
corporations in need of outside financing typically issued bonds, which 
enjoyed a longer-established, deeper, and more liquid market than equity 
securities.113 Perhaps for this reason, ownership of bonds and other forms of 
debt was commonly associated with the capitalist elite, while ownership of 
shares was more often associated with small investors and dependent 
beneficiaries, including the proverbial widows and orphans. Given these 
stereotypical notions of bondholders and shareholders, the less favorable 
treatment of equity under the tax bill was controversial: In the House, Ohio 
Democrat Tom Johnson argued that, as drafted, the corporate tax would punish 
the most disadvantaged members of society, including “widows or orphans or 
aged people.”114 Senator Hill of New York lamented that:  
this injustice is upon those people who have incomes of less 
than $4,000, the poor people of the country, the widows and 
orphans, and the men of infirm health, who rely upon the little 
accumulations which have been given to them or which they 
have worked for and laid up.115
Although a supporter of the income tax, Senator James Smith, a Democrat 
from New Jersey, also warned that the provisions concerning corporations 
risked “discriminating against the widow, the orphan, and the man of moderate 
means.”116
To address these concerns, Smith introduced an amendment in the 
Senate allowing corporations to deduct “any dividends paid to a single 
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stockholder not exceeding $4,000 annually.”117 Smith argued this deduction 
was necessary to protect not only vulnerable dependents such as widows and 
orphans, but also owners of small businesses and members of agricultural 
cooperatives.118 Smith’s proposal was criticized on the grounds that it would 
be impracticable to administer—according to Vest, the deduction provision 
“would be almost impossible of execution.”119 These criticisms were 
apparently effective, as Smith’s amendment was tabled by a 31–24 vote.120
Immediately following the vote on Smith’s amendment, Hill proposed a 
substantially similar amendment—the only difference being that it provided a 
$3,000 per shareholder deduction, rather than $4,000.121 Explaining the 
purpose of his amendment, Hill stated that his goal was not to benefit 
corporations, but rather to protect individual investors. Again characterizing 
the income tax as fundamentally flawed, he claimed its operation would 
constitute an injustice against the poor: “I am not complaining because it 
affects corporations,” he stated, “I am simply complaining that you make a 
discrimination against the poor man.”122 Hill’s rhetorical appeals 
notwithstanding, his amendment fared no better than Smith’s, being rejected 
by a vote of 33–20.123 Then, in a striking display of either dogged 
determination or political posturing (probably the latter), Hill proposed 
substantially similar amendments twice more—first with a deduction of 
$2,000 and finally with a deduction of $1,000.124 These too were rejected.125
Ultimately, no deductions of dividends would be included in the final law. 
Congress finally passed the 1894 Act in late August.126 As enacted, it 
retained the 2 percent tax on individual income exceeding $4,000127 as well as 
the 2 percent tax on all corporate income.128 Interest payments, but not 
dividends, were fully deductible by corporations.129 The corporate interest 
deduction was born. 
These developments were short-lived, however. The following year, 
in the Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co. decision, the Supreme Court 
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struck down the new tax before it was ever collected.130 In a controversial five 
to four ruling, the Court held that the income tax violated the Constitution’s 
requirement that direct taxes be apportioned on a population basis among the 
states.131 The Court’s decision came as a staggering defeat for the tax’s 
supporters, who had spent years fighting for income taxation in the national 
political arena. 
Like the Civil War income tax before it, however, the 1894 tax’s 
influence would extend far beyond its abbreviated lifespan. In removing 
interest—but not dividends—from the corporate income tax base, the 1894 
Act established a precedent followed by the income tax laws passed between 
1909 and 1913. Under the 1894 Act, interest was deductible from corporate 
income and subject to taxation when received by investors, while dividends 
were not deductible from corporate income and not subject to taxation when 
received by investors. Since interest and dividends were each subject to a 
single level of taxation (interest being taxed at the investor level and dividends 
being taxed at the corporate level), and since the individual and corporate tax 
rates were both 2 percent, the respective tax burdens on debt and equity were 
similar for investor income above $4,000.132 This same basic structure—
interest being taxed at the investor level and dividends being taxed at the 
corporate level—was recreated by the tax legislation of the early twentieth 
century. As detailed in Part III, it was during the decades of 1909 to 1939, 
under the pressures of war, depression, and a massively expanding federal 
budget, that preferential treatment of debt financing emerged as a permanent 
feature of American tax law. 
III. THE STATUTORY DEVELOPMENT OF THE DEBT-EQUITY
DISTINCTION
Income taxation returned to the U.S. in the early twentieth century—
this time permanently. Due to the constitutional constraints on direct taxation 
imposed by the Pollock decision, corporate and individual income taxes were 
reintroduced in two separate phases. First, a “special excise tax” on corporate 
profits––a corporate income tax in all but name––was enacted in 1909. This 
corporate tax was joined by a personal income tax in 1913, following 
ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment. Although the rates of these taxes 
were initially low (only 1 percent on corporate profits and 1 percent to 7 
percent on personal income), they would increase significantly within a few 
years of their enactment. The extraordinary cost of World War I would prompt 
the expansion of the income tax, transforming it into the U.S. government’s 
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single largest source of revenue. Tax rates decreased after the conclusion of 
the war and remained stable during the prosperity of the 1920s, but the back-
to-back crises of the Great Depression and World War II brought further 
dramatic changes to the tax system. 
Throughout this period, a variety of policy concerns pulled Congress 
in conflicting directions regarding the tax treatment of corporate debt and 
equity. On the one hand, many lawmakers feared that allowing corporations 
to deduct interest would encourage them to take on excess debt in order to 
reduce their taxes. On the other hand, lawmakers were also concerned that 
disallowing interest deduction would increase the tax burden on shareholders. 
Many in Congress assumed that any taxation of funds allocable to interest 
payments would be passed on to shareholders in the form of reduced 
dividends. The tax treatment of dividends themselves was also a complex 
issue. Politicians were vocal in their opposition to double taxation, but as we 
shall see, this opposition could waver in the face of political expediency. 
Finally, organized business became increasingly involved in tax policy during 
this period, injecting further complications into Congressional decision 
making. Spurred into action by World War I’s elevated tax rates—by far the 
highest to that point in American history—business exerted significant 
influence at several key junctures in the income tax’s evolution. During the 
three decades preceding World War II, these various factors converged 
together to shape the contemporary debt-equity distinction. 
A. The Corporation Tax of 1909 
In the years following the Pollock decision of 1895, political pressure 
to reestablish income taxation continued to mount, despite the constitutional 
hurdles imposed by the Supreme Court.133 An unprecedented wave of business 
consolidations occurring from 1895 to 1904 increased popular concern over 
the economic power of large corporations. In a rapid burst of merger activity, 
approximately 1,800 firms disappeared into larger enterprises, mainly by way 
of horizontal consolidations.134 Sudden, dramatic increases in the market share 
of America’s largest corporations fueled public resentment toward 
concentrated wealth, leading even Republican President Theodore Roosevelt 
to advocate graduated estate and income taxes in 1906.135 Pressure to reduce 
tariffs had not abated in the years following the Pollock decision, and with 
even Republican opposition softening, some form of major tax reform began 
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to seem inevitable.136 As the tax issue built to a head in 1909, newly-elected 
Republican President William Howard Taft brokered a tax reform compromise 
between Congressional conservatives (who opposed income taxation) and 
progressives (who supported it): Under Taft’s plan, a small tax on corporate 
profits would be enacted immediately, while the question of an individual 
income tax would be submitted to the states as a proposed constitutional 
amendment.137 Rather than describing the new corporation tax as an income 
tax, the measure was labeled a special excise tax pegged to corporate profits, 
a transparent (and ultimately successful) bid to circumvent the Pollock
holding.138 Labels aside, the 1909 corporation tax was an income tax both in 
design and effect. 
The treatment of corporate debt was an important question in drafting 
the new tax law. As part of the political compromise to which it owed its 
existence, the corporation tax was initially drafted by members of the Taft 
Administration, and the choice of whether to tax interest on bonds was a major 
issue in the Administration’s internal decision making.139 As in prior decades, 
corporate bonds remained closely associated with the nation’s wealthy in the 
public consciousness, and the Administration was reluctant to be seen as 
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allowing wealthy bondholders to avoid taxation.140 According to New York 
Republican Senator Elihu Root, a close ally of the Taft Administration and 
one of the corporation tax’s primary authors, the treatment of corporate bonds 
“was the subject of repeated discussion in which the President, the Attorney-
General, and other members of the Cabinet and members of the Committee on 
Finance of the Senate took part.”141 Despite initial reluctance, the Taft 
Administration ultimately decided to allow corporations to deduct interest on 
bonds, the tax’s authors fearing that to do otherwise would subject 
shareholders to double taxation. In Root’s words: 
[t]he final conclusion was that the imposition of this tax on 
the entire income, including the income assignable to the 
payment of interest on bonds, would result not in the taxation 
of bondholders, but in imposing a double tax on the 
stockholders, and it was not thought advisable to do it.142
In other words, Root and others believed taxation of any revenues 
allocable to interest payments would be passed on to equity holders. The Taft 
Administration also considered taxing interest payments directly upon receipt 
by bondholders, but this approach was deemed infeasible in light of the 
Pollock decision.143
When the Taft Administration’s proposals were first presented to the 
Senate Finance Committee in June of 1909, many committee members were 
opposed to interest deductibility, fearing that corporations would exchange 
bonds for stock in order to avoid the tax.144 Compounding this fear was the 
widespread corporate practice of selling watered stock—stock issued at prices 
exceeding a corporation’s book value, to the benefit of promoters and other 
corporate insiders. A specific concern regarding interest deductibility was that 
it would encourage corporations to issue discounted stock to insiders and then 
exchange that stock for debt (at full face value), so as to “water” (or dilute) the 
stock of outside investors while simultaneously sheltering income.145
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Representative Cordell Hull, a Democrat from Tennessee and a key figure in 
the drafting of the legislation, recalled the issue in 1916: “I think the original 
theory of the matter was that corporations could issue quite a lot of watered 
stock, transfer that into bonds, mortgage their property, and incur interest, and 
make a great many shifts in many ways that would result in avoiding the real 
purpose of the law.”146
Despite these concerns, a majority of the Senate Finance Committee 
eventually agreed that at least some measure of interest deductibility was 
necessary, for two reasons. First, as noted above, many lawmakers believed 
that disallowing interest deductibility would indirectly increase the tax burden 
on shareholders.147 Since the payment terms of outstanding corporate bonds 
were fixed—and since bond investors were generally thought to enjoy greater 
bargaining power than shareholders—lawmakers feared that taxing amounts 
paid as interest would simply reduce the residual funds available for 
dividends.148 Second, given that the corporation tax was designed to avoid the 
Pollock holding, some lawmakers feared that taxing revenue allocable to 
bondholders (or taxing bondholders directly) would be a step too far in the 
direction of an undisguised income tax, inviting constitutional challenge.149
Faced with these conflicting concerns, the committee settled on a middle 
position proposed by Senator Root: corporations would be permitted to deduct 
interest, but only on an amount of debt not exceeding their paid-up capital 
stock.150
When the corporation tax advanced from the Senate Finance 
Committee to the wider Senate, many Senators had misgivings over allowing 
even limited interest deductibility. In the July session, Senator Augustus 
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Bacon, a Democrat from Georgia, argued that no portion of a corporation’s 
interest payments should be exempt from taxation, repeating the familiar 
warning that corporations would avoid the tax by converting stock to bonds.151
Referring to popular attitudes toward bondholders, Bacon asserted that “[t]he 
desire to reach the bonded interests of the country would be very much more 
generally shared by the people at large than the desire to reach simply the 
stocks of corporations.”152 Based on this reading of the popular will, Bacon 
introduced an amendment to tax interest payments directly at a rate of 2 
percent, requiring corporations to withhold and pay the tax on behalf of 
bondholders.153 On motion of Senator Aldrich, Bacon’s amendment was 
tabled by a 41–34 vote, and no such withholding provision was included in the 
Senate’s version of the bill.154
Similar concerns were raised in the House, however. Representative 
William Cox, a Democrat from Indiana, protested that accumulated wealth in 
the form of bond holdings would not be adequately taxed under the Senate bill. 
Since interest payments were deductible from corporate income, but were not 
taxed when received by individual investors (there being no individual income 
tax), a significant portion of corporate profits would escape taxation 
altogether. According to Cox, “[t]he railroads alone, being bonded for upward 
of $6,000,000,000, and the trusts for at least an equal sum, these sums 
representing one-ninth of the total wealth of the country, under this system of 
taxation all this immense wealth will escape the burden.”155 Highlighting the 
connections—both actual and perceived—between corporate debt and the 
nation’s wealthiest citizens, Cox argued that bond holdings such as the 
Andrew Carnegie and Jay Gould fortunes would avoid “their just and 
proportionate share of taxation.”156 “The idea that men like Carnegie,” he 
stated, “now the holder of more than $300,000,000 worth of the bonds of the 
United States steel trust, escape federal taxation is indeed absurd.”157 Despite 
these criticisms, Cox ultimately agreed to support the tax bill, a reflection of 
Congress’s limited taxation options following the Pollock ruling. From the 
perspective of Cox and other Democrats, if taxing individual investors was off 
the table, the proposed corporation tax, however flawed, was better than 
nothing.158
The Senate Finance Committee’s limitation of interest deductibility to 
debt not exceeding paid-up capital stock was agreed to by the Conference 
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Committee and included in the final law, signed in August 1909, imposing a 
1 percent tax on corporate profits in excess of $5,000.159 Since the corporation 
tax was not accompanied by an individual income tax, corporate income paid 
as interest to individual debtholders went untaxed, subject to the paid-up 
capital limitation. Profits paid as dividends, on the other hand, were taxed at 
the corporate level.160 This disparity bestowed a tax advantage on debt 
financing, as corporations were able to offset interest payments against taxable 
income. With a corporate tax rate of only 1 percent, however, this advantage 
was so small that it likely had little effect on corporate financing decisions. It 
was not until after the return of individual income taxation that the tax 
advantage of debt would become economically significant. 
B. The Return of Individual Income Taxation 
The return of individual income taxation in 1913 occurred at the 
height of the Progressive Era. Progressive Democrat Woodrow Wilson won 
the 1912 presidential election, and the year 1913 witnessed several major 
developments in Progressive legal and regulatory reform. These included the 
Pujo Committee’s influential report on the “money trust” of Wall Street 
banking firms, the creation of the Federal Reserve System, the establishment 
of separate U.S. Departments of Commerce and Labor, and the ratification of 
the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Amendments to the Constitution.161
The tax-related developments of 1913 were particularly significant. 
Following the ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment—which allowed 
Congress to levy an unapportioned income tax, effectively overturning 
Pollock—the 1913 Act reinstituted individual income taxation while 
simultaneously reducing tariffs. This Act marked the beginning of a longer-
term policy shift by which the income tax would ultimately replace tariffs as 
the government’s primary source of revenue.162 The tax system evolved 
rapidly in the years following 1913, especially during the crises of the world 
wars and the Great Depression. Although the most dramatic of these changes 
came in the form of higher income tax rates, structural features of the tax 
system, such as the treatment of debt and equity, saw important changes as 
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well. The tax burden on debt and equity was similar under the 1913 Act, but 
by the late 1930s debt enjoyed a significant structural advantage over equity, 
a feature of U.S. tax law that has persisted to the present day. 
As enacted, the details of the 1913 Act were more elaborate than those 
of its predecessors. The Act imposed a “normal income tax” of 1 percent on 
individual income exceeding $3,000 ($4,000 for married couples), plus an 
“additional tax” increasing in graduated brackets to a maximum of 6 percent 
on income exceeding $500,000.163 As under the 1909 Act, business 
corporations were subject to a flat income tax of 1 percent (though now 
without the $5,000 exemption).164 Interest payments remained deductible, and 
the statutory deduction limit was relaxed: a corporation could now deduct 
interest on an amount of debt equal to one-half the sum of its paid-up capital 
and outstanding debt.165 Interest received by investors was taxed as ordinary 
income, subject to both the normal and additional taxes.166 Unlike interest, 
dividends were not deductible at the corporate level.167 At the individual level, 
however, dividends received a partial tax break: they were excluded from 
income for purposes of the normal tax, while being included for purposes of 
the graduated additional tax.168
The combined effect of these rules was that corporate revenues were 
subject to similar amounts of taxation regardless of whether they were paid as 
interest or distributed as dividends. To illustrate, profits distributed as 
dividends were subject to (a) the 1 percent corporate tax and (b) the individual 
additional tax (depending on the investor’s total income); whereas, interest 
payments were subject to (a) the 1 percent individual normal tax and (b) the 
individual additional tax (depending on the investor’s total income). If a 
corporation was managed with the goal of minimizing the tax burden on its 
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investors, it would have been indifferent between issuing debt or equity with 
the same pre-tax return.169
There were exceptions to this general parity, however. Dividends paid 
to other corporations (e.g., dividends paid by a subsidiary to a holding 
company) were not excluded from the receiving corporation’s income. Under 
the 1909 Act, such intercompany dividends had not been taxable.170 Under the 
1913 Act, corporations were subject to the 1 percent corporate tax, even 
though the paying corporation was also taxed on the underlying profits.171
Despite rhetorical opposition to double taxation, many lawmakers considered 
it politically necessary that the income tax reach unpopular trusts and holding 
companies. Lawmakers feared that exempting distributions from subsidiaries 
to holding companies would create the appearance of letting the nation’s 
largest corporations off the hook. 172 Since profits were taxed at both the 
subsidiary and holding company levels, the 1913 Act disadvantaged equity as 
a means of effecting intercompany transfers. A holding company that wished 
to avoid the double tax could instead structure its interest in a subsidiary as a 
loan.
As for the treatment of debt, the 1913 Act’s relaxation of the interest 
deduction limit was the first in a series of steps that would eventually 
culminate in the limit’s repeal. As originally reported by the Ways and Means 
Committee in April of 1913, the revenue bill followed the 1909 Act in limiting 
interest deductibility to debt not exceeding paid-up capital.173 After the bill 
passed the House, however, the Senate Finance Committee relaxed the limit. 
Under the committee’s version, corporations were allowed to deduct interest 
on debt not exceeding one-half the sum of outstanding debt and paid-up 
capital, a change accepted by the House in conference.174 During the 
committee’s hearings on the bill, several business lobbyists had requested that 
the deduction limit be increased, characterizing it as unfair to highly-leveraged 
companies and unnecessary given the new individual income tax.175 Although 
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neither the Senate Finance Committee’s amendment nor its acceptance by the 
House were specifically explained in the legislative record, it seems likely 
these appeals on the part of the business community were influential in 
Congress’s decision-making. 
The deduction limit was increased again in 1916—this time to debt 
not exceeding the sum of paid-up capital and one-half of outstanding debt.176
Unlike in 1913, this increase was accompanied by specific legislative 
discussion. During House debate of the 1916 bill, Representative Joseph 
Sherley, a Democrat from Kentucky, suggested that the deduction limit be 
removed entirely. Sherley questioned the limit’s fundamental rationale, given 
that interest was now taxed when received by individual debtholders. He also 
argued that the limit was unfair to corporations, since sole proprietorships, 
partnerships, and other unincorporated businesses—taxed under the individual 
income tax rules—were allowed to deduct interest in full. Finally, he pointed 
to problems with the limit’s application by the Bureau, arguing that “the 
provision has resulted in endless confusion in the department, conflicting 
rulings, and more trouble than almost any other single paragraph in the 
income-tax law.”177 Responding to Sherley’s criticisms, Representative Hull 
reiterated the limit’s primary purpose—to reduce the incentive for 
corporations to exchange stock for bonds. Although Hull supported 
maintaining the limit, his comments suggest he was not unsympathetic to the 
complaints being raised by the business community. Describing the 1909 
version of the limit as “somewhat drastic,” Hull remarked that subsequent 
increases were intended to moderate the limit’s effect.178 Ultimately, the 
deduction limit remained in place, though it was pegged at increasingly higher 
debt levels.179 This trend toward greater leniency would continue into World 
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War I, during which major developments in business taxation would lead to 
the limit’s complete repeal. 
C. World War I and Unlimited Interest Deductibility 
American entry into World War I brought major changes to the new 
income tax. Like the Civil War before it, World War I demanded extraordinary 
spending while simultaneously disrupting foreign trade and tariff revenues. 
Congress relied on the income tax to help finance mobilization, raising tax 
rates to levels unimaginable before the war. Ironically, while the war led to 
substantially higher tax rates, it would also lead to the permanent repeal of the 
limit on corporate interest deductibility. 
During the war, higher corporate income tax rates, together with the 
introduction of supplemental excess-profits and war-profits taxes, 
significantly increased the tax burden on American businesses.180 The excess-
profits tax was particularly heavy, accounting for approximately two-thirds of 
all tax revenues during the war.181 In 1917, the standard corporate income tax 
increased to a total rate of 6 percent.182 For the 1918 tax year, the 1919 Act 
increased the corporate tax rate again to 12 percent.183 These figures were 
dwarfed by the excess-profits tax, which reached as high as 80 percent for the 
1918 tax year.184
With American soldiers fighting overseas, business leaders were 
reluctant to directly criticize higher taxes. Rather than lobbying for the 
reduction of nominal tax rates, businesses instead focused on the tax laws’ 
more technical provisions.185 The interest deduction limit is a case in point. 
Higher marginal tax rates increased the value of deductions—all the more so 
because the amount of the excess-profits tax was calculated based on net 
income under the standard corporate income tax.186 As the value of deductions 
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increased, a broad array of businesses, trade groups, and conservative editorial 
boards began to call for the complete repeal of the interest deduction limit.187
Perhaps strategically, criticisms of the interest deduction limit often 
emphasized abstract notions of tax fairness, rather than focusing on the dollar 
amounts that businesses would save (and the Treasury would lose) if the limit 
were repealed. A common criticism was that overlap of the excess-profits tax 
and the interest deduction limit unfairly penalized debt financing, an argument 
based on the technical operation of the excess-profits tax. First enacted under 
the 1917 Act, the excess-profits tax (which applied to all businesses, not just 
corporations) was levied in addition to the standard income tax and was 
intended to capture the excess profits derived from war contracts. The tax was 
implemented in two different versions: the original version was enacted in the 
fall of 1917188 and a revised version applicable to the 1918 tax year was 
enacted in early 1919.189 Under the 1917 Act, the tax was calculated as a 
graduated percentage of a company’s net income, ranging from 0 percent to 
60 percent, which increased along with the ratio of the company’s net income 
to its statutorily-defined “invested capital.” In other words, the greater a 
company’s net income divided by its invested capital, the higher the rate of 
the excess-profits tax.190 Under the 1919 Act, the tax was calculated as a 
graduated percentage of net income, ranging from 0 percent to 65 percent, 
which, again, increased along with the ratio of the company’s net income to 
its invested capital.191 The 1919 Act also added a war-profits bracket of 80 
percent, subject to a deduction based on the company’s pre-war financial 
performance.192 Under both the 1917 and 1919 versions, the greater a 
company’s invested capital (other things being equal), the less its excess-
profits tax liability. Critically, invested capital was defined to include equity 
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and undistributed profits, but not to include most forms of debt.193 Since debt 
financing did not contribute to invested capital, the excess-profits tax weighed 
heavier on highly leveraged firms. Critics argued that this penalty on debt 
financing more than offset the benefit of interest deductibility, and that as long 
as the excess-profits tax remained in effect, the interest deduction limit should 
be removed.  
Examples of this argument can be found in Congressional hearings on 
the war revenue acts, where business representatives—often present at 
Republican invitation—submitted their views on pending tax legislation. In a 
statement to the Senate Finance Committee in 1917, A. E. Holcomb, the 
Assistant Secretary of AT&T, argued that the deduction limit had become a 
“peculiar” and “arbitrary” anachronism.194 At the same hearing, 
representatives of the Interborough Rapid Transit Co. termed the limit 
“unjust,” arguing that it was particularly inequitable in conjunction with the 
excess-profits tax.195 At another Senate Finance Committee hearing, Benson 
Watson, Secretary of the National Association of Credit Men (a major trade 
group representing credit professionals), argued that since debt was excluded 
from invested capital under the excess-profits tax, “the business entity should 
have the privilege of charging, as a business expense, the total amount of 
interest paid.”196 W. E. Humphrey, a lobbyist representing northwestern 
mortgage lenders, testified that because of the deduction limit, highly indebted 
firms could accrue tax liabilities even when operating at a loss, an outcome 
with “no justice to it.”197 This injustice was compounded by the operation of 
the excess-profits tax, he argued, which penalized borrowing even further.198
Addressing the deduction limit’s original policy rationale, Humphrey 
summarized his critique as follows: 
I never knew of but one reason why it was inserted in the 
present law, and that reason was, probably, to keep a 
corporation from decreasing its capital stock and increasing 
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its bonded indebtedness. But if that was the reason, that is the 
only reason I can imagine why it ever did get into law; and 
that reason has disappeared under the excess-profits tax, 
because if they reduce their capital stock and increase their 
bonded indebtedness they would have to pay more.199
According to Humphrey, the excess-profits tax negated the deduction limit’s 
reason for existence. 
Perhaps responding to these criticisms, the Treasury Department 
issued regulations in early 1918 that broadened the definition of invested 
capital under the excess-profits tax. Under the Treasury Department’s 
regulations, corporations were permitted to include debt in invested capital, 
but only to the extent that interest thereon was not deductible from taxable 
income (i.e., to the extent it exceeded the statutory deduction limit).200 By 
reducing the excess-profits tax’s penalty on debt financing, this regulatory 
action seemed to address the business community’s primary grievance. 
Nevertheless, lobbying against the deduction limit continued. In what 
appears to have been a particularly influential step, a large coalition of banks 
and trust companies petitioned the Ways and Means Committee in June of 
1918.201 In written testimony cosigned by 36 financial companies (including 
powerful Wall Street institutions such as Chase National Bank, Goldman, 
Sachs & Co., and the Guaranty Trust Company), the coalition put forward 
several tax reform recommendations, including complete elimination of the 
interest deduction limit.202 Many of these companies stood to benefit from the 
limit’s repeal, not only because they themselves used considerable amounts of 
debt financing, but also because a large portion of their business was 
underwriting bonds issued by their clients. 
The Ways and Means Committee was receptive to the coalition’s 
arguments. “The suggestions are most valuable,” Democratic Chairman 
Claude Kitchin remarked, “and I am sure that the Committee will take them 
under serious consideration.”203 Indeed, several of the group’s proposals—
including its suggestion to eliminate the interest deduction limit—were 
incorporated by the Ways and Means Committee into the revenue bill reported 
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in September.204 In its report, the Ways and Means Committee explained (in 
language echoing that of corporate lobbyists) that since borrowed money was 
not included in “invested capital” under the excess-profits tax, it was “only 
fair” to allow the deduction of all interest from taxable income.205 Strangely, 
the Ways and Means Committee made no mention of the fact that the Treasury 
Department had already addressed this issue earlier in the year.206 In any case, 
the Ways and Means Committee’s change—lauded in the business press—was 
included in the final law enacted February 1919.207
As this sequence of events makes clear, Congress’s primary rationale 
for repealing the interest deduction limit was the manner in which it 
overlapped with the excess-profits tax. However, when the excess-profits tax 
was itself repealed in 1921, unlimited interest deductibility remained in place, 
without any explanation in the legislative history.208 Although previously a 
recurrent subject of vigorous debate, in just a few short years, interest 
deductibility appears to have become a fait accompli among lawmakers. The 
sole discussion of interest deductibility in the legislative history of the 
Revenue Act of 1921 concerned whether taxpayers could deduct interest on 
debt incurred to purchase tax-exempt securities.209 At no point in these 
discussions did lawmakers express any doubt as to whether interest should be 
fully deductible by corporations in ordinary circumstances.210
By repealing the excess-profits tax without restoring the interest 
deduction limit, the Revenue Act of 1921 began the era of unlimited interest 
deductibility. Interest has remained fully deductible by corporations ever 
since, subject to specific and relatively narrow exceptions. During the 1920s, 
the tax advantage conferred on debt financing by interest deductibility was 
relatively small, as interest received was taxable to individuals, while 
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dividends remained partially exempt.211 As discussed below, the advent of full 
double taxation in the 1930s would disturb this balance, providing corporate 
debt a more economically potent advantage over equity. 
D. Double Taxation 
Despite Congress’s oft-voiced concern for avoiding double taxation, 
corporate profits were in fact regularly double taxed, even prior to the 1930s. 
Under the 1913 Act, corporate profits were taxed at the entity level. When the 
same profits were distributed to shareholders as dividends, they were excluded 
from income for purposes of the modest “normal income tax,” but included in 
income for purposes of the graduated “additional tax.”212 This meant that 
dividend income received by shareholders who were subject to the additional 
tax (i.e., wealthy shareholders) was actually taxed twice: once when 
recognized by the corporation and again when received by the individual 
investor. 
At first, this limited form of double taxation was of little economic 
significance, as at 1 percent, the corporate rate was not only extremely low (by 
today’s standards), but also identical to the individual normal rate.213 Parity 
between the corporate rate and the individual normal rate (from which 
dividends were exempt) meant that interest and dividends were generally 
subject to the same amount of taxation, regardless of the individual taxpayer’s 
income. Profits distributed as dividends were subject to (a) the 1 percent 
corporate tax plus (b) the applicable amount (if any) of the individual 
additional tax, while revenues paid as interest were subject to (a) the 1 percent 
individual tax plus (b) the applicable amount (if any) of the individual 
additional tax. An exception, of course, was interest paid by corporations in 
excess of the interest deduction limit. These amounts were subject to the 
corporate tax, the individual normal tax, and the individual additional tax.214
As discussed above, the interest deduction limit was repealed by the 1919 Act, 
which applied to the 1918 tax year. 
Beginning in 1917, corporate and individual rates began to diverge, 
with the corporate rate surpassing the individual normal rate.215 Although a 
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higher corporate tax rate would have tended to disadvantage equity relative to 
debt (since dividends were not deductible from corporate income), the 
operation of the excess-profits tax from 1917 to 1921 dominated this effect by 
significantly penalizing debt. Given the higher corporate tax rate and the 
elimination of the interest deduction limit, this disadvantage was reversed 
when the excess-profits tax was repealed, and the total tax burden on dividends 
(i.e., corporate plus individual taxes) was greater than that on interest for the 
remainder of the decade. 
The tax disadvantage of equity financing increased during the New 
Deal, when a series of legislative developments led to full double taxation of 
dividends. During President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s first term, amidst the 
depths of the Great Depression, several of Roosevelt’s advisers recommended 
policies intended to deter corporations from hoarding profits in the form of 
retained earnings.216 These advisers, including Adolf Berle, Raymond Moley, 
and Rexford Tugwell (each Columbia University professors and members of 
Roosevelt’s “brain trust” of academic advisers), believed excessive earnings 
retention had contributed to the depression and was impeding economic 
recovery.217 They argued that encouraging corporations to increase dividend 
payments would stimulate the economy by putting money back in the hands 
of investors.218 This macroeconomic argument was joined by a concern that 
retained earnings were being undertaxed, as income retained at the corporate 
level and not distributed as dividends escaped the graduated surtax otherwise 
payable by wealthy investors—as had been the case since 1913, individual 
income remained subject to a graduated additional tax, now called a “surtax,” 
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at high income levels.219 In order to address both issues, Roosevelt’s advisers 
proposed levying a special tax on retained earnings.220
Following this recommendation, Roosevelt proposed major changes 
to corporate taxation in a special budget message delivered to Congress in 
early 1936.221 Under the President’s proposal, (a) earnings retained by 
corporations would be subject to a new undistributed-profits tax, (b) 
corporations would be permitted to deduct dividend payments from taxable 
income, and (c) dividend payments received by investors would be fully taxed 
at the individual level (under both the normal income tax and the surtax).222
The combined effect of this proposal was that corporate income would be 
taxed once at the corporate level if retained under the undistributed-profits tax 
or once at the individual level if distributed as dividends under applicable 
individual taxes. Corporate income would be subject to double taxation only 
if it were retained in one tax year and then distributed to shareholders in a 
subsequent tax year. Describing a need to plug “leaks” in the U.S. tax system, 
President Roosevelt argued for his proposal in the following terms: 
The accumulation of surplus in corporations 
controlled by taxpayers with large incomes is encouraged by 
the present freedom of undistributed corporate income from 
surtaxes. Since stockholders are the beneficial owners of both 
distributed and undistributed corporate income, the aim, as a 
matter of fundamental equity, should be to seek equality of 
tax burden on all corporate income whether distributed or 
withheld from the beneficial owners. As the law now stands 
our corporate taxes dip too deeply into the shares of corporate 
earnings going to stockholders who need the disbursement of 
dividends; while the shares of stockholders who can afford to 
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leave earnings undistributed escape current surtaxes 
altogether.223
In other words, Roosevelt advocated direct taxation of corporate 
surpluses in order to reach the beneficial (if unrealized) income of individual 
shareholders.
Roosevelt’s proposal drew strong criticism from the business 
community. The primary objection was not that Roosevelt’s proposal entailed 
higher taxes, but rather that the government was attempting to use the tax 
system to substitute its own business judgment for that of corporate 
managers.224 Many business leaders feared that an undistributed-profits tax 
would incite shareholders to demand higher dividends, reducing management 
prerogative over the allocation of corporate funds.225 For Roosevelt 
Administration advisers such as Adolf Berle, who believed that managers 
hoarded earnings to entrench their own economic power, this was exactly the 
point.226
The controversy over the undistributed-profits tax reflected two major 
developments in American business history: first, the growth of public stock 
ownership during the early twentieth century, and second, the corresponding 
increase in managers’ independence from investors. The growth of public 
shareholding, beginning in the 1890s and accelerating rapidly in the 1920s, 
meant that large corporations were increasingly owned by diffuse, anonymous 
public shareholders.227 Reflecting this trend, the total annual trading volume 
on the New York Stock Exchange increased dramatically during this period, 
growing from 159 million in 1900 to a pre-crash peak of 1.1 billion in 1929.228
Broad public shareholding contributed to the separation of ownership and 
control identified by Berle. As corporate ownership became more and more 
                                                     
223. Id.
224. Bank, Corporate Managers, supra note 16, at 198–203. 
225. Id.
226. Berle’s views were expressed in his seminal work on corporate 
governance (written with Gardiner Means), The Modern Corporation and Private 
Property. ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND 
PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932) [hereinafter BERLE & MEANS, THE MODERN 
CORPORATION]. 
227. The rise of public stock ownership was initially driven by the great 
merger movement of 1895 through1904, in which a sweeping wave of industrial 
consolidations was financed in large part by floating public stock. BASKIN & MIRANTI,
A HISTORY OF CORPORATE FINANCE, supra note 95, at 193–97. 
228. Id. at 167. This increase in trading volume was accompanied by rising 
stock values: The Dow Jones Industrial Average increased from a low of 52.96 in 1900 
to a pre-crash peak of 381.17 in 1929. Historical Chart Gallery: Dow Jones Industrial 
Average (1900-present, monthly), STOCKCHARTS.COM, http://stockcharts.com/free 
charts/historical/djia1900.html (last visited Mar. 13, 2014). 
2015]  The Historical Origins of the Debt-Equity Distinction 141
dispersed, professional managers (often holding only small equity stakes) 
became increasingly autonomous from unorganized investors.229
Despite this separation of ownership and control, at the time of 
Roosevelt’s proposal, the interests of management and affluent shareholders 
were actually aligned for tax purposes. Wealthy shareholders benefited if 
earnings were retained at the corporate level due to the high individual surtax 
that would otherwise be triggered by dividend payments. As of 1935, this 
surtax ranged as high as 75 percent, while the maximum corporate rate was 
only 15.75 percent.230 As Roosevelt had alluded in his budget message to 
Congress, many shareholders preferred that earnings not be distributed as 
dividends, a preference which was reinforced by favorable tax treatment of 
capital gains.231 At the time, up to 70 percent of long-term capital gains could 
be excluded from individual income, meaning that if an investor held corporate 
stock long enough prior to sale (the maximum exclusion was achieved if stock 
was held 10 years or more), appreciation was taxed at a maximum rate of only 
23.7 percent.232 Wealthy shareholders therefore paid less taxes if corporate 
earnings were “locked in” at the corporate level and realized as capital gains 
in later years. Roosevelt’s proposal to replace the corporate income tax with a 
heavy undistributed-profits tax threatened to reverse this calculus. By taxing 
the “accumulation of surplus in corporations,” the undistributed-profits tax 
was intended to drive a wedge between managers’ and shareholders’ 
preferences regarding dividend policy.233
Notwithstanding staunch opposition from business groups, the 
Roosevelt Administration’s proposals—including an undistributed-profits tax 
ranging as high as 42.5 percent—were included in a revenue bill passed by the 
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House in April 1936, by an overwhelming 267–93 margin.234 When the bill 
reached the more conservative Senate Finance Committee later that month, 
however, business was able to successfully intervene. The U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce (the nation’s largest business group), a number of smaller trade 
organizations, and a host of individual companies invested significant effort 
into influencing the committee’s handling of the bill. These efforts were not 
enough to block the undistributed-profits tax entirely, but the version of the 
tax that emerged from the committee was significantly weaker than the 
Roosevelt Administration’s original proposal. 
In the course of its deliberations, the Senate Finance Committee heard 
testimony from approximately 100 outside witnesses, most of whom spoke on 
behalf of business interests.235 Reflecting the growing presence of business 
organizations in national politics, the range of industry groups at the hearings 
was extremely broad, including not only the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, but 
also the American Association of Railroads, the American Bankers’ 
Association, the American Management Association, the American Mining 
Congress, the National Association of Credit Men, the National Association 
of Manufacturers, and many others. Over the preceding decades, national 
business associations had grown in number, size, and influence, often with 
active support from the U.S. Department of Commerce. Perhaps ironically, the 
involvement of these associations in federal lawmaking processes had actually 
increased under the cooperative system of industry cartelization administered 
by Roosevelt’s National Recovery Administration.236 In Washington, these 
associations were collectively represented by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, 
itself originally created at the behest of the Taft Administration.237 These 
groups, lobbying on behalf of their members, overwhelmingly opposed the 
undistributed-profits tax.238
For the most part, business associations generally represented the 
outlook and policy preferences of professional managers. However, it is 
important to note that the undistributed-profits tax was also opposed by at least 
some shareholders. In a particularly interesting case of shareholder opposition, 
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Catherine Curtis, director of Women Investors in America (claiming to 
represent between one-third and one-half, by number, of all shareholders in 
large public corporations), testified to the Senate Finance Committee that the 
likely result of the “unsound,” “revolutionary,” “confiscatory” undistributed-
profits tax was that “small businesses are destroyed, recovery is retarded, 
investments are impaired.”239 Of particular concern to Women Investors in 
America was that the undistributed-profits tax would prevent corporations 
from building financial reserves to protect against business downturns. This 
was precisely the same argument made by many corporate managers. The 
extent to which Women Investors in America’s position was representative of 
other shareholder groups is unclear, but—perhaps tellingly—I have found no 
evidence of any shareholder groups supporting the undistributed-profits tax. 
Following its hearings, the Senate Finance Committee significantly 
modified Roosevelt’s bill. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce was particularly 
influential in this process—not only did it participate in the committee’s 
hearings, it was also directly involved in drafting the committee’s 
amendments.240 The committee’s most important changes were to reduce the 
maximum undistributed-profits tax from 42.5 percent to 7 percent, while at the 
same time restoring the standard corporate income tax.241 Although business 
interests would have preferred to reduce all corporate taxation as much as 
possible (including eliminating the standard corporate income tax), a looming 
federal budget deficit barred major reductions to tax revenue.242 A 
compromise solution acceptable to business was to maintain the existing 
corporate income tax, while significantly reducing the undistributed-profits 
tax.243
In early June, the Senate Finance Committee’s amendments were 
accepted by the wider Senate, meaning the Conference Committee was faced 
with conflicting versions of the same bill.244 Following protracted 
negotiations, House and Senate conferees eventually reached an elaborate 
compromise. The undistributed-profits tax was set at graduated rates of 7 
percent to 27 percent (based on the percentage of the corporation’s net income 
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that remained undistributed in a given tax year), a range which was lower than 
the House version, but higher than the Senate version.245 The standard 
corporate income tax was preserved at graduated rates ranging from 8 percent 
to 15 percent.246 Finally and significantly, dividends received were no longer 
exempt for purposes of the individual normal tax.247 Thus, under the final 
legislation enacted in late June under the Revenue Act of 1936, corporate 
earnings were subject to full double taxation: profits were taxed at the 
corporate level when recognized by the corporation, then taxed again at the 
individual level if distributed to shareholders or again at the corporate level if 
retained as undistributed profits.248
The passage of the undistributed-profits tax, even in diluted form, did 
not bring an end to business’s campaign against the measure. Upon its 
enactment, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce issued a statement condemning 
the new tax, and urged businesses to press for its repeal in the next 
congressional session.249 A year later, in 1937, reversal of the burgeoning 
economic recovery stoked further hostility to the tax. As the nation was finally 
recovering from the Great Depression, the U.S. economy entered a severe 
double-dip recession in 1937, the Dow Jones Industrial Average losing nearly 
half its value between 1937 and 1938. Corporate leaders were quick to blame 
the undistributed-profits tax, claiming it had shattered business confidence.250
Unsurprisingly, this argument was embraced by congressional Republicans, 
but as the Roosevelt Administration failed to produce an effective response to 
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the economic downturn, hostility toward the tax began to spread to 
conservative and then moderate Democrats as well.251 By 1938, bipartisan 
dissatisfaction with the undistributed-profits tax had reached a point at which 
congressional intervention seemed all but certain.252 Indeed, “in an effort to 
encourage and stimulate business” and to promote “a freer flow of capital into 
productive enterprises,” the Revenue Act of 1938 reduced the undistributed-
profits tax to only 2.5 percent.253 The next year, the Revenue Act of 1939 
allowed the tax to completely expire.254
While effectively killing the undistributed-profits tax, the Revenue 
Act of 1938 did not restore the exclusion of dividends from the individual 
normal tax—an incongruous outcome given the pro-investment rhetoric 
surrounding the act’s passage. Why was the dividend exclusion not restored? 
An important reason may be that during the political run-up to the Revenue 
Act of 1938, the undistributed-profits tax was the overriding concern of 
business groups, and—whether by strategy or oversight—they focused little 
attention on the tax treatment of dividends paid to investors.255 After all, 
corporate managers had only limited incentives to lobby for tax rules that 
would primarily benefit shareholders. Another reason may be that 
shareholders themselves were far less politically organized than the 
management-centered business lobby. The legislative record provides 
abundant evidence of the influence of business associations, but with rare 
exceptions (such as the 1936 testimony of Women Investors in America), 
shareholders are most notable for their absence. A final reason may be that 
since the individual normal tax was only 4 percent, the issue was simply not 
very salient in the context of much higher surtax rates.256 Whatever the 
reasons, the result of preserving the corporate income tax without restoring the 
individual dividend exclusion was that dividends paid to individual 
shareholders remained subject to full double taxation. Given decades’ worth 
of impassioned denouncements of double taxation by both parties in Congress, 
this outcome is probably best understood as an ironic byproduct of the political 
                                                     
251. Bank, Corporate Managers, supra note 16 at 234–39. 
252. Id. at 234–39. 
253. S. REP. NO. 75-1576, at 1 (1938). Under the Revenue Act of 1938, the 
undistributed-profits tax took the form of a maximum 2.5 percentage point reduction 
in the corporate income tax rate. Revenue Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-554, § 
13(c)(2)(B), 52 Stat. 447, 355 (1938); see infra Appendix row 12. 
254. Revenue Act of 1939, Pub. L. No. 76-155, 53 Stat. 862 (1939). 
255. For a detailed discussion of the legislative history of the Revenue Act 
of 1938 as it relates to double taxation, see Bank, Corporate Managers, supra note 
16, at 239–55. 
256. Revenue Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-554, §§ 11, 12, 52 Stat. 447, 
452?55 (1938). 
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bargaining process. There is nothing to suggest that either Republicans or 
Democrats considered double taxation a policy goal. 
The irony of this result is magnified by the fact that double taxation—
a product of business lobbying—would later become the target of intense 
criticism from business groups. Arguing that double taxation burdens capital 
investment, business groups today, including the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, 
regularly call for its elimination.257 During the New Deal era, business groups 
were willing to accept this burden if it meant avoiding the undistributed-profits 
tax.258 Indeed, it was not until after the undistributed-profits tax had been 
scheduled to expire that business leaders began to publically criticize double 
taxation. Even then, lobbying against double taxation was a low priority for 
corporate managers—especially compared to business-level tax cuts that more 
directly affected the resources under their control.259
According to Steven Bank, managers’ willingness to trade double 
taxation against the undistributed-profits tax is yet another example of the 
agency problem well known in corporate governance scholarship.260 For the 
most part, I agree with this explanation. What must be added to Bank’s 
account, however, are the sweeping changes in American political economy—
the emergence of the corporation as the nation’s dominant economic 
institution, the increasingly decentralized ownership of corporations by diffuse 
public shareholders, and the growing political power of the national business 
lobby—which in combination allowed the policy preferences of corporate 
managers to triumph in Washington, even during years in which Democrats 
controlled the White House and both chambers of Congress. At a more 
detailed level, what must also be emphasized is that the shift from partial 
double taxation to full double taxation in 1936 resulted in only a 4 percentage 
point increase in the total taxation of dividends, at a time when surtax rates, 
which had always been applicable to dividends, ranged as high as 75 percent. 
From this perspective, the marginal difference between dividend taxation 
                                                     
257. For examples of business criticism of double taxation, see BUS.
ROUNDTABLE, EFFECTIVE LEADERSHIP ON THE WORLD STAGE (2011), 
http://businessroundtable.org/sites/default/filesFullBinder.pdf; Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs., 
Tax Policy (2012), http://old.nam.org/Issues/Official-Policy-Positions/Tax-
Technology-Domestic-Economic-Policy/TTDEP-01-Tax-Policy.aspx; U.S. Chamber 
of Commerce, Chamber Pushes Broadest Tax Relief for All (2003), 
http://www.uschamber.com/press/releases/2003/may/chamber-pushes-broadest-tax-
relief-all; U.S. Chamber of Commerce, “State of American Business 2003” (2003), 
http://www.uschamber.com/press/speeches/2003/january-15. 
258. Bank, Corporate Managers, supra note 16, at 222–23. 
259. Bank, Corporate Managers, supra note 16, at 256–57. 
260. For a more economically rigorous analysis of the agency costs 
surrounding the undistributed-profits tax, see William G. Christie & Vikram Nanda, 
Free Cash Flow, Shareholder Value, and the Undistributed Profits Tax of 1936 and 
1937, 49 J. FIN. 1727 (1994). 
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before and after 1936 was simply not very significant. It was not until the 
normal income tax and the surtax were consolidated into a single graduated 
income tax after World War II that double taxation of dividends became a 
mobilizing issue. During the 1950s, marginal rates that ranged as high as 91 
percent prompted growing criticism of double taxation, leading to a number 
of proposals to integrate the corporate and individual income taxes.261 High 
rates also encouraged the postwar proliferation of hybrid securities—custom 
investment instruments designed to provide the economic characteristics of 
equity securities, while qualifying as debt securities for tax purposes and thus 
allowing the deduction, as interest, of payments to investors. As corporations 
sought to avoid the heavy taxation of equity capital, they became more and 
more creative in the design and use of hybrid securities. Indeed, it was 
precisely these practices—made possible by the law’s binary treatment of debt 
and equity—that drew increasing critical attention to the debt-equity 
distinction in the legal literature.262
Although the U.S. tax system continued to evolve through the postwar 
era and beyond, the debt-equity distinction had become relatively fixed by the 
beginning of World War II. Following the Revenue Act of 1938, interest was 
fully deductible at the corporate level and fully taxable at the individual level, 
while profits were fully taxable at the corporate level and taxable again when 
received as dividends. Despite widespread criticism and calls for reform, this 
same basic framework remains in place today.263
IV. CONCLUSION
The history of the debt-equity distinction reveals little in the way of 
forethought or design. Rather than advancing any conscious policy goal, each 
major step in the distinction’s evolution was an ad hoc response to the 
immediate historical context. Thus, the permanent institution of corporate 
interest deductibility in 1894 was shaped by temporary economic conditions 
following the panic of 1893. Similarly, the permanent repeal of the interest 
                                                     
261. See, e.g., Stock Exchange Heads Urge Senate to Ease Double Tax on 
Dividends, WALL ST. J., Apr. 13, 1954, at 24. This criticism helped contribute to the 
statutory provision of the S corporation, a type of corporation immune from entity-
level taxation (similar to a partnership), but only available to small businesses. Mirit 
Eyal-Cohen, When American Small Business Hit the Jackpot: Taxes, Politics, and the 
History of Organizational Choice in the 1950s, 6 PITT. TAX REV. 1 (2008). Double 
taxation would remain in effect for public corporations through the end of the century. 
BANK, SWORD TO SHIELD, supra note 16, at 191–236. 
262. See, e.g., Emmerich, Hybrid Instruments, supra note 3; Plumb, The 
Federal Income Tax Significance of Corporate Debt, supra note 3. 
263. Congress has recently taken partial steps toward integration. Dividend 
income (and capital gains) is today subject to a preferred rate of 23.8 percent, 
compared to the maximum rate of 39.6 percent for ordinary income. See supra note 6. 
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deduction limit during World War I was premised on the temporary operation 
of the excess-profits tax. Finally, the rise of permanent full double taxation in 
the 1930s was a byproduct of the political battle over the temporary 
undistributed-profits tax. Intended to address short-term political issues, the 
consequences of these decisions have outlived their historical origins. 
Beyond the specific issue of the debt-equity distinction, what can this 
history tell us regarding the broader development of the U.S. tax system? 
Based on my research, I would propose two general insights. First, tax policy 
outcomes are not the result of rational technocratic processes, but neither are 
they sufficiently explained in simple terms of special-interest politics. Rather, 
tax policy is often the result of reactive, context-driven decision making, by 
which short-term political issues come to dictate long-term policy outcomes. 
Path dependence, a common feature of institutional evolution, may be 
particularly significant in the tax policy context. The economic and political 
benefits of stable, predictable tax rules create a strong bias against reform—
even in situations where existing rules are merely the legacy of historical 
circumstances. Robert C. Clark has written that the structure of the corporate 
tax system derives from political choices made at its inception, the system’s 
“major traits determined by a set of genes fixed in its infancy.”264 Clark may 
overstate the point, but his argument is suggestive of the longevity of tax 
policy choices.265
The second insight (in some tension with the first) is that the policy 
preferences of corporate managers, as represented by the national business 
lobby, have played a major role in the development of corporate tax law. 
Business interests were an important factor in each of the key junctures in the 
debt-equity distinction’s evolution: the decision to allow corporations to 
deduct interest on debt in 1894, the relaxation and eventual repeal of the 
interest deduction limit from the years 1913 through 1921, and the advent of 
full double taxation of dividends in the 1930s. The national business lobby’s 
increasing role in tax policy reflected broader developments in the relative 
political power of corporate managers and investors. Just as the rise of interest 
deductibility and the defeat of the undistributed-profits tax reflected the 
political influence of corporate managers, the establishment of full double 
taxation reflected the lack of influence of unorganized shareholders. Again, 
however, lest the ability of managers to dictate their preferred vision of tax 
                                                     
264. Robert C. Clark, The Morphogenesis of Subchapter C: An Essay in 
Statutory Evolution and Reform, 87 YALE L J. 90, 90–92 (1977). 
265. Clark’s primary concern in “The Morphogenesis of Subchapter C” is 
the growing complexity of tax law over time, a process which he argues has occurred 
in a “cumulative, evolutionary way.” Id. at 92. For another account of tax law’s 
increasing complexity, see Berger, Simple Interest, supra note 11. For an analysis of 
the income tax’s historical development framed in the political theory of 
incrementalism, see WITTE, POLITICS AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 29.  
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policy be overstated, it should be emphasized that double taxation—a 
byproduct of business opposition to the undistributed-profits tax—is today the 
subject of persistent criticism from the business community itself.266 This 
ironic turn of events suggests that the priorities of special interest groups may 
be subject to the same short-term biases as those of legislators. 
Ultimately, the history of the debt-equity distinction supports the 
arguments of its present-day critics. Lacking a consistent policy basis and 
shaped by ad hoc responses to shifting external pressures, it is hardly 
surprising that the distinction appears arbitrary from a contemporary 
perspective. The history of the distinction may also offer tangible lessons 
regarding tax reform. Three such lessons spring immediately to mind: First, 
major features of the tax system can (and do) emerge in the absence of 
intentional policy design. Second, there is no reason to expect such features to 
be optimal from any theoretical standpoint. Finally, tax policy decisions 
possess significant inertia, and become difficult to reverse once made. These 
lessons suggest that serious reform proposals regarding the tax treatment of 
debt and equity should be based on deliberate, theoretically-informed policy 
design that Congress’s past legislative decisions on the matter should be 
afforded little deference, and that better tax policy may be possible if the 
system were reconsidered from the ground up. Unfortunately, they also 
suggest that fundamental tax reform is extraordinarily difficult, and that 
smaller changes at the margin may be the only realistic course available. In the 
end, from the perspective of achieving simple, elegant, and economically 
efficient tax policy, the lessons of the debt-equity distinction may be less than 
encouraging. 
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APPENDIX: SELECTED DEVELOPMENTS IN THE TAX TREATMENT
OF CORPORATE DEBT AND EQUITY, 1861–1938 
This table summarizes certain legislative developments discussed in 
the accompanying article. The goal is to show major structural changes in the 
taxation of corporate revenues (both at the corporate level and upon 
distribution to investors). This table represents a partial summary only—many 
tax law developments are not included.
LEGISLATION 
DEBT EQUITY 
Tax Treatment of 
Interest Paid by 
Corporations 
Tax Treatment of 
Interest Received 
by Individuals 
Tax Treatment of 
Corporate Profits 
Tax Treatment of 
Dividends 
Received by 
Individuals
1. 1861 Act
(income tax was 
enacted but not 
collected) 
No corporate-level 
income taxation 
Subject to income 
tax of 3% on 
income in excess 
of $800 
No corporate-level 
income taxation 
Subject to income 
tax of 3% on 
income in excess 
of $800 
2. 1862 Act No corporate-level 
income taxation. 
Withholding tax of 3% 
applicable to interest 
paid by certain 
transportation 
companies 
Subject to income 
tax of 3% on 
income exceeding 
$600 (5% if the 
taxpayer’s income 
exceeded 
$10,000). 
Interest payments 
subject to 
corporate 
withholding tax 
deductible from 
individual income 
No corporate-level 
income taxation. 
Withholding tax of 
3% applicable to 
dividends paid by 
certain financial 
and transportation 
companies 
Subject to income 
tax of 3% on 
income exceeding 
$600 (5% if the 
taxpayer’s income 
exceeded 
$10,000). 
Dividends subject 
to corporate 
withholding tax 
deductible from 
individual income 
3. 1864 Act No corporate-level 
income taxation. 
Withholding tax of 5% 
applicable to interest 
paid by certain 
transportation 
companies 
Subject to 
graduated income 
tax ranging from 
5%-10%. 
Interest payments 
subject to 
corporate 
withholding tax 
deductible from 
individual income 
No corporate-level 
income taxation. 
Withholding tax of 
5% applicable to 
dividends paid by 
certain financial 
and transportation 
companies 
Subject to 
graduated income 
tax ranging from 
5%-10%. 
Dividends subject 
to corporate 
withholding tax 
deductible from 
individual income 
4. 1894 Act
(income tax was 
enacted but not 
collected) 
Deductible from 
taxable corporate 
income 
Subject to income 
tax of 2% on 
income in excess 
of $4,000 
Subject to 
corporate-level 
income tax of 2% 
Excluded from 
individual income 
taxation 
5. 1909 Act Deductible from 
taxable corporate 
income, but only on 
debt not exceeding 
paid-up capital stock 
No individual 
income taxation 
Subject to tax of 
1% on profits in 
excess of $5,000 
No individual 
income taxation 
6. 1913 Act Deductible from 
taxable corporate 
income, but only on 
debt not exceeding 
one-half the sum of 
debt and paid-up 
capital stock 
Subject to normal 
income tax of 1% 
on income in 
excess of $3,000. 
Also subject to 
graduated 
additional tax 
ranging from 1%-
6% on income in 
excess of $20,000 
Subject to corporate 
income tax of 1% 
Exempt for 
purposes of the 
normal income tax 
Subject to 
graduated 
additional tax 
ranging from 1%-
6% on income in 
excess of $20,000 
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267. Pursuant to the Revenue Act of 1921, the excess-profits tax was 
repealed as of January 1, 1922. 
268. Corporations were allowed to deduct 90 percent of dividends received 
from other corporations. 
269. Corporations were allowed to deduct 85 percent of dividends received 
from other corporations. Corporate profits that were not distributed to investors were 
subject to a graduated undistributed-profits tax ranging from 7 percent to 27 percent. 
LEGISLATION
DEBT EQUITY
Tax Treatment of 
Interest Paid by 
Corporations 
Tax Treatment of 
Interest Received 
by Individuals 
Tax Treatment of 
Corporate Profits 
Tax Treatment of 
Dividends 
Received by 
Individuals
7. 1916 Act Deductible from 
taxable corporate 
income, but only on 
debt not exceeding the 
sum of paid-up capital 
stock and one-half of 
outstanding debt 
Subject to normal 
income tax of 2% 
on income in 
excess of $3,000. 
Also subject to 
graduated 
additional tax 
ranging from 1%-
13% on income in 
excess of $20,000 
Subject to corporate 
income tax of 2% 
Exempt for 
purposes of the 
normal income 
tax. 
Subject to 
graduated 
additional tax 
ranging from 1%-
13% on income in 
excess of $20,000 
8. 1919 Act
(enacted February 
24, 1919) 
Fully deductible for 
purposes of the 
corporate income tax 
and excess-profits tax 
Subject to normal 
income tax of 6% 
on income up to 
$4,000 and 12% 
on income in 
excess of $4,000. 
Also subject to 
graduated surtax 
ranging from 1%-
65% on income in 
excess of $5,000 
Subject to corporate 
income tax of 12%. 
Also subject to 
graduated excess-
profits/war-profits 
tax ranging from 
0%-80% 
Exempt for 
purposes of the 
normal income 
tax. 
Subject to 
graduated surtax 
ranging from 1%-
65% on income in 
excess of $5,000 
9. Revenue Act 
of 1921267
Fully deductible from 
taxable corporate 
income 
Subject to normal 
income tax of 6% 
on income up to 
$4,000 and 8% on 
income in excess 
of $4,000. 
Also subject to 
graduated surtax 
ranging from 1%-
65% on income in 
excess of $5,000 
Subject to corporate 
income tax of 
12.5% 
Exempt for 
purposes of the 
normal income 
tax. 
Subject to 
graduated surtax 
ranging from 1%-
65% on income in 
excess of $5,000 
10. Revenue Act 
of 1935 
Fully deductible from 
taxable corporate 
income 
Subject to normal 
income tax of 4%. 
Also subject to 
graduated surtax 
ranging from 4%-
75% on income in 
excess of $4,000 
Subject to 
graduated corporate 
income tax ranging 
from 12.5%-
15.75%268
Exempt for 
purposes of the 
normal income 
tax. 
Subject to 
graduated surtax 
ranging from 4%-
75% on income in 
excess of $4,000 
11. Revenue Act 
of 1936 
Fully deductible from 
taxable corporate 
income 
Subject to normal 
income tax of 4%. 
Also subject to 
graduated surtax 
ranging from 4%-
75% on income in 
excess of $4,000 
Subject to 
graduated corporate 
income tax ranging 
from 8%-15%269
Subject to normal 
income tax of 4%.  
Also subject to 
graduated surtax 
ranging from 4%-
75% on income in 
excess of $4,000 
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270. Corporations received a tax credit equal to approximately 14 percent of 
dividends received from other corporations. An available dividends-paid credit (the 
last vestige of the undistributed-profits tax) could reduce the corporate income tax rate 
from 19 percent to 16.5 percent. 
LEGISLATION
DEBT EQUITY
Tax Treatment of 
Interest Paid by 
Corporations
Tax Treatment of 
Interest Received 
by Individuals
Tax Treatment of 
Corporate Profits
Tax Treatment of 
Dividends 
Received by 
Individuals
12. Revenue Act 
of 1938 
Fully deductible from 
taxable corporate 
income 
Subject to normal 
income tax of 4%. 
Also subject to 
graduated surtax 
ranging from 4%-
75% on income in 
excess of $4,000 
Corporations with 
profits in excess of 
$25,000 subject to 
corporate income 
tax of 19%270
Subject to normal 
income tax of 4%. 
Also subject to 
graduated surtax 
ranging from 4%-
75% on income in 
excess of $4,000 
